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ABSTRACT
This work is motivated by the emergence of participatory sensing applica-
tions, a new sensing paradigm that off-loads sensing responsibility from in-
frastructure sensors and professional sources to the crowd. This leads to
unprecedented opportunities for sensory data collection and sharing. The
privacy challenges in these applications arise naturally as personal data are
shared among untrusted entities in the community. This dissertation de-
velops mathematical foundations for optimal perturbation of both single-
dimensional and multidimensional time-series data. The developed pertur-
bation techniques allow users to effectively hide their original data while
aggregated community statistics are still accurately reconstructed. Several
real-world applications are also developed and successfully deployed that af-
firm the efficiency and accuracy of the perturbation and reconstruction tech-
niques developed in this dissertation.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Introduction
While classical embedded systems typically concerned themselves with inter-
actions of computing artifacts with physical processes, future cyber-physical
systems will live at the nexus of social systems, networks, and distributed
physical environments. The explosive growth of mobile devices over the past
decade has enabled the emergence of smart mobile devices that are capable
of capturing, processing, and transmitting physical measurements of their
users such as location, velocity and biometrics. Examples of such devices in-
clude cell phones with GPS capabilities, pedometers, accelerometers, vehicu-
lar with on-board diagnostics (OBD-II) readers, and watches with heart-rate
monitoring sensors. These advances have encouraged the research community
to explore new sensing paradigms that off-load sensing responsibility from in-
frastructure sensors and professional sources to the crowd. This paradigm,
commonly known as crowdsourcing is exemplified in recent work on participa-
tory sensing [1] and urban sensing [2]. Participatory sensing has tremendous
potential because it harnesses the power of ordinary citizens to collect sensor
data for applications spanning environmental monitoring, intelligent trans-
portation, and public health, that are often not cost-viable using dedicated
sensing infrastructure. Examples of such applications include BikeNet [3],
DietSense [4] and CarTel [5].
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This work focuses on the privacy problem of time-series data that arises
when sensing is off-loaded to the crowd. Individuals who need to share data
may be unwilling to reveal their private measurement. Nevertheless, the
data are needed to support interesting new community applications. Data
anonymization is often ineffective because the data values themselves may
be highly correlated with the identity of the owner; for example, a GPS
trajectory may clearly identify a person’s home. Our approach to resolve
this problem is to perturb the data at the source prior to sharing, which
allows users to control the amount of information being shared. The idea is
to ensure that (i) original private data of an individual cannot be accurately
reconstructed from shared perturbed data, yet (ii) the aggregate statistics of
data collected from multiple sources can be accurately estimated despite the
perturbation.
Below, we identify the main challenges in finding good data perturbation
and reconstruction techniques and that satisfy the above two conflicting ob-
jectives.
• Correlation within time-series sensor data
Most data collected from sensors are correlated in time which might
cause serious threats to user privacy. The dynamic correlations and
auto-correlations, if not carefully considered, may allow for the recon-
struction of the original data. From the signal processing perspective,
correlated time series can be expressed in parametric models whose
number of parameters is much smaller than the number of shared data
points. Thus, instead of estimating all data points, adversaries can es-
timate the model parameters from which original data points or private
information can be extracted.
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It has been shown that perturbation techniques using independent noise
[6, 7] are vulnerable to PCA based techniques [8, 9]. Kalman filter [10]
is very effective in removing independent noise from perturbed data
whose original data model is linear. In general, it is possible to filter
independent noise from the shared data unless the noise is so large that
no useful information can be extracted from data aggregation either.
The privacy problem for time-series data has caught the attention of
the research community recently [11, 12]. No one, however, has been
able to quantify the achieved privacy. Thus there is a desire for a
perturbation scheme that is capable of providing quantifiable privacy
for highly correlated time-series data.
• Lack of good trade-off privacy measures
A variety of privacy metrics have been proposed for different purposes.
For example, a data metric [13, 14, 15, 16] measures the data qual-
ity in the entire anonymous table with respect to the data quality in
the original table. A search metric [14, 17, 18] guides each step of an
anonymization algorithm to identify an anonymous table with maxi-
mum information or minimum distortion.
In the context of perturbation techniques, it is natural to focus on trade-
off metrics which measure the privacy and the corresponding utility
achieved from the perturbed data. There have been some attempts to
define good trade-off metrics [7, 19]. All of those, however, are designed
for specific types of attacks and cannot be used to quantify the privacy
in general. Another problem with previous privacy measures is that
they require a broad knowledge of the data (e.g., distribution, model)
which is hard to acquire in general. As a result, the lack of good
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privacy quantification makes it hard to compare the privacy approaches
objectively or choose the amount of noise to add in order to meet a given
privacy objective. In this work, we aim to find a good trade-off privacy
measure which requires little knowledge about the source data and is
resilient to a wide range of attacks.
• Multidimensionality of data
In practice, the application might want to collect different kinds of
information from users for the purpose of aggregating the real-world
properties. For example, a traffic mapping application might want to
collect both location and speed information to aggregate the speed dis-
tribution at a certain location in the city. However, a client might
not want to admit to speeding, and might not want their location to
be tracked. Multidimensional data exposes more security risks than
single-dimensional data. Besides the auto-correlation of each stream,
cross-correlation among data streams can also be used to breach pri-
vacy. In addition, multidimensionality of data introduces the scalabil-
ity problem into the reconstruction algorithm. Thus we need to make
sure that the reconstruction algorithm scales with the number of data
streams. Therefore, it is desired to have both multidimensional per-
turbation and scalable reconstruction techniques that allow accurate
aggregation of the community statistics in high dimension.
In this work, we contribute to three main aspects of the privacy prob-
lem. First, we present effective perturbation and reconstruction algorithms
for both single-dimensional and multidimensional time-series data. Second,
we present the fundamental bound on privacy and formulate the pertur-
bation problem for time-series data as an optimization problem; hence an
optimal perturbation scheme can be found. Finally, we develop real-world
applications that make use of the proposed perturbation and reconstruction
techniques. The contributions of this work are described in detail below.
First, we solve the perturbation and reconstruction for one-dimensional
time-series data. We show in this work that privacy of time-series data can
be preserved if the noise used to perturb the data is itself generated from a
process that approximately models the phenomenon. The intuition behind
this idea is that if the noise and the signal have similar models, then the
spectra of both overlap, making it impossible to separate the signal from the
injected noise. Since the shared data is the sum of the real data and the
noise, the distribution of the shared data is the convolution between the dis-
tribution of the real data and the distribution of the noise. Thus the problem
of estimating the community distribution given the perturbed data and the
noise distribution becomes a deconvolution problem. We solve the deconvolu-
tion problem by using the Tikhonov-Miller [20] technique with success. The
advantage of applying statistical techniques to the privacy problem is that
we are able to solve several associated privacy problems including detection
of malicious users, and servers, and derive the relation between privacy and
utility which is not possible with the policy-based privacy techniques.
We integrate the privacy techniques into Poolview [19], a participatory
sensing application platform, and develop two sample applications: Traffic
Analyzer and Diet Tracker. The Traffic Analyzer application allows users
to share their speed data in a privacy preserving way for the purpose of ag-
gregating traffic patterns such as rush hour traffic, off-peak traffic, average
delay between different key points in the city as a function of time of day
and day of the week, and the average speeding statistics on selected streets.
The other application, Diet Tracker, is motivated by the numerous weight
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watchers and diet communities that exist today. An individual on a particu-
lar diet monitors her weight on a periodic basis. This individual would likely
be interested in comparing her weight loss to that of other people on a diet
in order to get feedback regarding the effectiveness of the diet program she
is following. However, the person would like to do it in such a manner that
her weight data remains private.
Second, to find the optimal trade-off between privacy and utility, we pro-
pose an information-theoretic privacy measure which quantifies the amount
of information leak contained in the perturbed data. Using the proposed
privacy measure, we are able to find a perturbation scheme which guarantees
a tight upper bound on privacy. This is an important contribution since this
bound offers a measure of “goodness” of time-series perturbation techniques
in general. Then we derive an optimal perturbation in the sense of achieving
the privacy bound for a given level of noise power.
Third, to aggregate the community statistics when multiple perturbed data
streams are shared, we proposed a reconstruction technique for multidimen-
sional data stream. Previous data perturbation techniques fail to ensure
either privacy or correct reconstruction of community statistics in the case
of correlated multidimensional time-series data. The algorithm proposed in
this work allows participants to add noise to multiple correlated data streams
prior to sharing in a privacy-preserved way while making sure that relevant
community statistics are still reconstructible. We also developed a partic-
ipatory sensing application for traffic monitoring which allows participants
to “lie” about both their real location and speed, while letting the commu-
nity estimate useful traffic statistics (e.g., speed map, percentage of speeding
vehicle) with high accuracy.
Finally, we propose an optimal perturbation technique for multi-stream
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data. We extend the optimal perturbation framework for single-dimensional
data to the case of multidimensional data. We show that the information-
theoretic privacy measure can be used as a privacy measure for multidimen-
sional time series. We further propose an optimal perturbation scheme that
allows users to perturb their multidimensional timeseries before sharing. The
perturbation scheme not only provides privacy for individual streams but also
protects data of one stream from being inferred from data of other streams.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes
the algorithms for perturbing and reconstructing one-dimensional time-series
data. Chapter 3 presents the fundamental bound on privacy of single-
dimensional time series and an optimal perturbation scheme that achieves
that bound. Next, we describe algorithms for perturbing multidimensional
time-series data and reconstructing multidimensional community distribu-
tion in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 proposes an optimal perturbation scheme for
multidimensional timeseries. Finally, related work and future developments
are summarized in Chapters 6 and 7, respectively.
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CHAPTER 2
PERTURBATION OF
SINGLE-DIMENSIONAL TIME SERIES
In this chapter, we develop a mathematical foundation for perturbing single-
dimensional time series to provide privacy guarantees for stream data in par-
ticipatory sensing applications. In participatory sensing, community mem-
bers may set up data aggregation services to compute statistics of interest.
In such scenarios, the existence of mutual trust or a trust hierarchy cannot
always be assumed. Hence, our data perturbation techniques allow users
to perturb private measurements before sharing. The techniques address
the special requirements of time series data; namely, the fact that data are
correlated, making it possible to attack privacy. A correlated noise model is
proposed and implemented. We show that community statistics can be recon-
structed with accuracy while individual user data cannot be recovered. The
algorithms are implemented on top of PoolView , a framework for developing
participatory sensing applications. Two simple sensing services are developed
for illustration; one computes traffic statistics from subscriber GPS data and
the other computes weight statistics for a particular diet. Evaluation, using
actual data traces, demonstrates the functionality of the algorithms in real
world applications.
8
2.1 Introduction
Much of the past sensor networks research focused on networking issues,
a scope naturally suggested by the name of the discipline. Another very
important aspect of distributed sensing, however, is data management . In
this work, we focus on privacy as a category of data management concerns
in emerging applications. Our work is motivated by the recent surge in dis-
tributed collection of data by self-selected participants for the purpose of
characterizing aggregate real-world properties, computing community statis-
tics, or mapping physical phenomena of mutual interest. This type of appli-
cations has recently been called participatory sensing [1]. Examples of such
applications include CarTel [5], BikeNet [3], and ImageScape [4].
In this chapter, we present mathematical foundations to enable grassroots
participatory sensing applications. Unlike applications where data aggrega-
tion is performed by trusted entities such as phone service providers or city
governments, grassroots applications may be initiated by ordinary individ-
uals in the same manner as one might start a Wiki or blog on a topic of
common interest. We consider communities of individuals with sensors col-
lecting streams of private data for personal reasons, that could also be of
value if shared with the community to compute aggregate metrics of mutual
interest. One main problem in such application is privacy. This problem
motivates our work.
In this work, we address privacy assurances in the absence of a trust hier-
archy. We rely on data perturbation at the data source to empower clients
to ensure privacy of their data themselves using tools that perturb such data
prior to sharing for aggregation purposes. Privacy approaches, including
data perturbation, are generally met with criticism for several good rea-
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sons. First, it has been repeatedly shown that adding random noise to data
does not protect privacy. It is generally easy to reconstruct data from noisy
measurements, unless noise is so large that utility cannot be attained from
sharing the noisy data. Second, anonymity (another approach to privacy)
does not help either. Anonymized GPS data still reveals the identity of the
user. Withholding location data in a radius around the home can be a solu-
tion, but opting to withhold, in itself, may reveal information. Moreover, in
a sparsely deployed network, the radius would have to be very large to truly
anonymize the data. A third question is whether the assumption of lack of
a centralized trusted entity is valid. After all, we already entrust our cell
phone providers with a significant amount of information. It should not be
difficult to provide added-value services that benefit from the current (fairly
extensive) trust model.
This chapter addresses the above questions. The fundamental insight why
perturbation techniques do not protect privacy is correlation among different
pieces of data or between data and context (e.g., identity of owner). We take
the small step of addressing correlations within a data stream. We show that
with proper tools, non-expert users can generate appropriately correlated
application-specific noise in the absence of trust, such that data of these
individuals cannot be reconstructed correctly, but community aggregates can
still be computed with accuracy. We further explain how non-expert users
might be able to generate the appropriate application-specific noise without
trusting external parties related to that specific application.
Observe that inability to reconstruct actual user data largely obviates the
need for anonymity. Also, note that our solutions are not needed for scenarios
where a hierarchy of trust exists (e.g., applications driven by cell phone
carriers). In contrast to such scenarios, in this work, we are interested in
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providing a way for individuals in the community to collect information from
their peers to answer questions such as “How well does this or that diet
or exercise routine work?” or “What patterns of energy use at home really
worked for you to reduce your energy bill?”
One main goal in this work is to compute perturbation such that (i) it
preserves the privacy of application-specific data streams against common
reconstruction algorithms, (ii) it allows computation of community aggre-
gates within proven accuracy bounds, and (iii) the perturbation (which may
be application-specific) can be applied by non-expert users without having
to trust the application. Hence, any person can propose a custom statistic
and set up a pool to collect (perturbed) data from non-expert peers who can
verify independently that they are applying the “right” (application-specific)
perturbation to preserve their privacy before sharing their data.
As alluded to above, ensuring privacy of data streams via perturbation
techniques is complicated by the existence of correlation among subsequent
data values in time-series data. Such correlations can, in general, be lever-
aged to attack the privacy of the stream. For example, sharing a single data
value representing one’s weight perturbed by adding a random number be-
tween -2000 and 2000 pounds will usually not reveal much about the real
weight.1 On the other hand, sharing the current weight value every day, per-
turbed by a different random number, makes it possible to guess the weight
progressively more accurately simply by averaging the sequence to cancel out
noise. Perturbing the sequence by adding the same random number every
day does not work either because it will reveal the trend in weight measure-
ments over time (e.g., how much weight the individual loses or gains every
1We say usually because, for example, a shared value of 2300 pounds in the above
example will still indicate a weight problem considering that at most 2000 pounds can be
attributed to added noise. This issue is addressed later.
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day). Our goal is to hide both the actual value and trend of a given in-
dividual’s data series, while allowing such statistics to be computed over a
community. Hence, for example, a community of weight watchers can record
their weights as measured on a particular diet, allowing weight-loss statistics
(such as average weight loss and standard deviation of loss) to be computed
as a function of time on the diet.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
perturbation and reconstruction techniques that we develop for sharing time-
series data in a privacy-preserving manner. We discuss the results from the
two case studies in Section 2.3. Finally, we conclude the work in Section 2.4
and discuss directions for future research.
2.2 Perturbation and Reconstruction Algorithms
Consider a participatory sensing application where users collect data that
are then shared (in a perturbed form) to compute community statistics.
CarTel [5] describes the challenges and solutions for real-time data collection.
We address the complementary problem of stream privacy. The reader may
assume an application where statistics are computed after the fact (such
as average traffic or average energy consumption statistics), or where they
evolve very slowly (such as weight statistics).
In this section, we provide the mathematical foundations needed for per-
turbing time-series data in grassroots participatory sensing applications. Our
perturbation problem is defined as follows. Perturb a user’s sequence of data
values such that (i) the individual data items and their trend (i.e., their
changes with time) cannot be estimated without large error, whereas (ii) the
distribution of community data at any point in time, as well as the average
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community data trend are estimated with high accuracy.
For instance, in the weight-watchers example, it may be desired to find
the average weight loss trend as well as the distribution of weight loss as
a function of time on the diet. This is to be accomplished without being
able to reconstruct any individual’s weight and weight trend. For another
example, it may be desired to compute the average traffic speed on a given
city street, as well as the speed variance (i.e., the degree to which traffic is
“stop-and-go”), using speed data contributed by individuals without being
able to reconstruct any individual’s speed and acceleration curves.
Examples of data perturbation techniques can be found in [6, 7, 21]. The
general idea is to add random noise with a known distribution to the user’s
data, after which a reconstruction algorithm is used to estimate the distri-
bution of the original data. Early approaches relied on adding independent
random noise. These approaches were shown to be inadequate. For exam-
ple, a special technique based on random matrix theory has been proposed
in [8] to recover the user data with high accuracy. Later approaches con-
sidered hiding individual data values collected from different private parties,
taking into account that data from different individuals may be correlated
[9]. However, they do not make assumptions on the model describing the
evolution of data values from a given party over time, which can be used to
jeopardize privacy of data streams. By developing a perturbation technique
that specifically considers the data evolution model, we show that it is strong
against attacks that extract regularities in correlated data such as spectral
filtering [8] and principal component analysis (PCA) [9].
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2.2.1 A General Overview
We show in this work that privacy of time-series data (measuring some phe-
nomenon) can be preserved if the noise used to perturb the data is itself
generated from a process that approximately models the phenomenon. For
instance, in the weight watchers example, we may have an intuitive feel for the
time scales and ranges of weight evolution when humans gain or lose weight.
Hence, a noise model can be constructed that exports realistic-looking pa-
rameters for both the direction and time-constant of weight changes. We can
think of this noise as the (possibly scaled) output of a virtual user . For now,
let us not worry about who actually comes up with the noise model and what
the trust implications are. Later, we shall revisit this issue in depth.
Once the noise model is (somehow) available, its structure and probability
distributions of all parameters are shared with the community. By choosing
random values for these parameters from the specified distribution, it is pos-
sible to generate arbitrary weight curves of (virtual people) showing weight
gain or loss. A real user can then add their true weight curve to that of
one or several locally generated virtual users obtained from the noise model.
The actual model parameters used to generate the noise are kept private.
The resulting perturbed stream is shared with the pool where it can be ag-
gregated with that of others in the community. Since the distributions of
noise model parameters are statistically known, it is possible to estimate the
sum, average and distribution of added noise (of the entire community) as
a function of time. Subtracting that known average noise time series from
the sum of perturbed community curves will thus yield the true community
trend. The distribution of community data at a given time can similarly be
determined since the distribution of noise (i.e., data from virtual users) is
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known. The estimate improves with community size.
A useful refinement of the above technique is to separate the virtual user
model parameters that are inputs from those that express intrinsic properties
of the model. For example, food intake may be an input parameter of a
virtual user model. Inputs can be time-varying. Our perturbation algorithm
allows changing the values of input model parameters with time. Since the
input fed to the virtual users is not shared, it becomes very hard to extract
real user data from added noise (i.e., virtual user) curves.
One last question relates to the issue of trust. Earlier, we motivated per-
turbation approaches in part by the lack of a central trusted party that would
otherwise be able to privately collect real unperturbed data and compute the
needed statistics. Given that non-experts cannot be asked to program noise
models for each new application (or even be expected to know what these
models are), and since they cannot trust the data collection party, where does
the noise (i.e., the virtual user) model come from and how does a non-expert
client know that the model is not fake? Obtaining the noise model from
an untrusted party is risky. If the party is malicious, it could send a “bad”
model that is, say, a constant, or a very fast-changing function (that can be
easily separated from real data using a low-pass filter), or perhaps a function
with a very small range that perturbs real data by only a negligible amount.
Such noise models will not perturb data in a way that protects privacy.
The answer comes from the requirement, stated earlier, that the noise
added be an approximation of the real phenomenon. Incidentally, observe
that the above requirement does not mean that the noise curve is similar
to the user data curve. It only means that both come from a model of the
same structure but different parameters. Hence, in the weight example, it
could be that the user is losing weight whereas the noise added is a curve
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that shows weight gain. Both curves come from the same model structure
(e.g., a first order dynamic system that responds to food intake with a gain
and time-constant). The models would have different parameters (a different
gain, a different time-constant, and importantly a different input modeling
the time-varying food intake).
With the above in mind, we allow the server (that is untrusted with our
private data) to announce the used noise model structure and parameter dis-
tribution to the community of users. The model announced by the server can
be trusted by a user only if that user’s own data could have been generated
from some parameter instantiation of that model with a non-trivial proba-
bility. This can be tested locally by a curve-fitting tool on the user’s side
the first time the user uses the pool. Informally, a noise model structure and
parameter distributions are accepted by a user only if (i) the curve fitting
error for the user’s own data is not too large and (ii) the identified model
parameter values for the user’s data (that result from curve fitting) are not
too improbable (given the probability distributions of model parameters).
In the rest of this section, we formalize the notions of perturbation, re-
construction, and model validation discussed above. We prove properties of
the approach such as the degree of privacy achieved and the community re-
construction error. The details on the data model and noise generation are
discussed in detail in Section 2.2.2. The algorithm for reconstructing commu-
nity statistics from perturbed data is discussed in Section 2.2.3 and Section
2.2.4, respectively. Furthermore, the analysis of error of the reconstruction
algorithm is discussed in Section 2.2.5. Finally, the user privacy is presented
in Section 2.2.6.
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2.2.2 Data Perturbation Algorithm
Consider a particular application where a pool (an aggregation server) col-
lects data from a community to perform statistics. To describe the perturba-
tion algorithm, let N be the number of users in the community. LetM be the
number of data points sent to the aggregation server by each user (we assume
this to be the same across users for notational simplicity, but the algorithm
does not depend on that). Let xi = (xi1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
M), n
i = (ni1, n
i
2, . . . , n
i
M),
and yi = (yi1, y
i
2, . . . , y
i
M) represent the data stream, noise and perturbed data
shared by user i, respectively. At time instant k, let fk(x) be the empirical
community distribution, f ek(x) be the exact community distribution, fk(n)
be the noise distribution, and fk(y) be the perturbed community distribu-
tion. The exact community distribution is the distribution of a community
with infinite population. In reality, this is not the case; therefore, we use
the notion empirical community distribution to address the distribution of
a true community with limited population. The notion of exact community
distribution is useful when the reconstruction error of a small community is
considered.
Most user data streams can be generated according to either linear or non-
linear discrete models. In general, a model can be written as g(k, θ,u), a
discrete function of index k, which can be time, distance, etc., depending on
the application, parameters θ, and inputs u. Notice that θ is a vector of fixed
length parameters characterizing the model, while u is a vector of length M
characterizing the input to the model at each instance.
For example, in the Diet Tracker application, the weight of a dieting user
over time [22] can be characterized by three parameters λk, β, andW0, where
β is the body metabolism coefficient, W0 is the initial weight of the person
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right before dieting, and λk is the average calorie intake of that person on day
k. The weight W (k) of a dieting user on day k of the diet is characterized
by a non-linear equation:
W (k) = W (k − 1) + λk − βW (k − 1)3/4 (2.1)
W (0) = W0 (2.2)
In this example, the model parameter is θ = (β,W0) and the input to the
model is u = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λM). From Equations (2.1, 2.2), given θ, and u,
one can generate the weight of the user with high accuracy. While the model
for a dieting person is not private and the probability distributions of weight
parameters over a large population can be approximately hypothesized, it is
desired to hide the parameters θ and u of any given user to prevent their
being estimated. This protects an individual user’s privacy.
Once the model for shared data is known, the entire data stream of user
i can be represented as a pair of parameter vectors (θi,ui). We can assume
that for the community, θi is drawn from a probability distribution fθ(θ)
and ui is drawn from another probability distribution fu(u). Both the real
distributions fθ(θ) and fu(u) are unknown to the aggregation server.
The distributions fθ(θ) and fu(u) are important since they characterize
typical data streams of the users in a community. To generate noise with the
same model as the data, the parameters θ and u are required. Because the
real distributions fθ(θ) and fu(u) are unknown, approximate distributions
fnθ (θ) and f
n
u (u) are used to generate θ and u, respectively.
In short, given the data xi = (xi1, x
i
2, . . . , x
i
M), the model g(k, θ,u), and
the approximated distributions fnθ (θ), f
n
u (u), the perturbed data for user i
is generated as follows:
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• Generate samples θi
n
and ui
n
from the distributions fnθ (θ) and f
n
u (u),
respectively.
• Generate noise stream ni = (ni1, ni2, . . . , niM ), where nik = g(k, θin, uin).
• Generate perturbed data by adding the noise stream to the data stream
yi = xi + ni.
To achieve better privacy, a scaled version of the noise may be added to the
data; thus the perturbed data will now be yi = xi + Ani, where A is either
a random variable chosen from a known distribution fA(A) or a constant.
However, the choice of fA(A) (if A is a random variable) or the value of A (if
A is a constant) must be the same for all users in the community so that the
aggregation server can be able to reconstruct the community distribution. In
the situation where a scaling factor is used, the parameters associated with A
are provided by the aggregation server along with the model and the model’s
parameters.
2.2.3 Reconstruction of Community Average
In this section, we consider a simple case where the aggregation server is
interested in estimating the community average at a certain time instance
k. Since the parameter distributions (fnθ (θ), f
n
u (u), fA(A)) and the model
g(k, θ,u) are known, the noise distribution at arbitrary time instance k can
be accurately calculated. All users use the same data model structure and
parameter distributions to generate their noise streams. Therefore the noise
distribution at any time instance k is the same for all the users and is denoted
as fk(n).
Upon receiving the the perturbed data yi from all users, the aggregation
server calculates the empirical average of the community data at time k as
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PAk =
1
N
∑N
i=1 y
i
k. By the law of large numbers, if the number of users in the
community (N) is large enough, the empirical value is equal to the expected
value of the community perturbed data E[yk]. We can write E[yk] as
E[yk] = E[xk + Ank] (2.3)
= E[xk] + E[A]E[nk] (2.4)
Because the distributions of A and nk are known to the aggregation server,
E[A] and E[nk] can be computed. Therefore the community average at time
k can be estimated as E[xk] = PAk − E[A]E[nk]. Note that Equation (2.4)
follows from Equation (2.3) because A is either a constant or a random
variable that is independent of nk.
In the special case where A is chosen as a zero mean random variable, the
estimated community average at time k is also the average of the perturbed
data at time k. In other words, the server simply averages the perturbed
data to get (a good estimate of) the true community average.
2.2.4 Reconstruction of Community Distributions
We will now describe the more general problem of reconstructing the distri-
bution (as opposed the average) of community data at a given point in time.
At time instance k, the perturbed data of each user is the sum of the actual
data and the noise yik = x
i
k+n
i
k. Thus the distribution of the perturbed data
fk(y) is the convolution of the community distribution fk(x) and the noise
distribution fk(n):
fk(y) = fk(n) ∗ fk(x) (2.5)
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All the distributions in Equation (2.5) can be discretized as fk(n) =
(fn(0), fn(1), . . . , fn(L)), fk(x) = (fx(0), fx(1), . . . , fx(L)), and fk(y) =
(fy(0), fy(1), . . . , fy(2L)). And the Equation (2.5) can be rewritten as
fy(m) =
∞∑
k=−∞
fx(k)fn(m− k) (2.6)
Since convolution is a linear operator, Equation (2.6) can be written as
fk(y) = Hfk(x) (2.7)
where H is a L × (2L + 1) Toeplitz cyclic matrix, which is also called the
blurring kernel, constructed from elements of the discrete distribution fk(n)
as
H =


fn(0) 0 0 . . . 0
fn(1) fn(0) 0 . . . 0
fn(2) fn(1) fn(0) . . . 0
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
0 0 . . . fn(L) fn(L− 1)
0 0 0 . . . fn(L)


(2.8)
In Equation (2.7), fk(x) is the community distribution at time k that needs
to be estimated, H is known and fk(y) is the empirical perturbed data dis-
tribution. This problem is well known in the literature as the deconvolution
problem. Several algorithms have been developed to solve this problem and
can be categorized into two classes. The first is a set of iterative algorithms,
such as the Richardson-Lucy algorithm, EM algorithm, and Poisson MAP
method. The second class of algorithms is non-iterative; examples include
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Tikhonov-Miller restoration and SECB restoration.
None of the iterative algorithms give bounds on the reconstruction error,
while the non-iterative algorithms, supported by the well defined mathemat-
ical optimization methods, give upper bounds on the reconstruction error. In
this work, the Tikhonov-Miller restoration method is employed to compute
the community distribution.
The Tikhonov-Miller restoration [20] requires an apriori bound  for the
L2 norm of the noise, together with an apriori bound M for the L2 norm of
the community distribution:
||Hf ek(x)− fk(y)||2 ≤  (2.9)
||(HTH)−νf ek(x)||2 ≤ M (2.10)
Throughout this work, || ||p denotes the Lp(R) norm of a vector. The
optimal solution fk(x) is chosen to minimize the regularized quadratic func-
tional:
||Hfk(x)− fk(y)||22 +
( 
M
)2
||(HTH)−νfk(x)||22 (2.11)
The fraction λ = /M is called the regularization coefficient which governs
the relative importance between the error and the regularized term [23].
By minimizing Equation (2.11), the exact expression for the optimal solu-
tion f ∗k (x) can be found:
f ∗k (x) = Q
−1
T H
Tfk(y) (2.12)
QT = H
TH +
( 
M
)2
(HTH)−2ν (2.13)
Equations (2.12) and (2.13) are used in the aggregation server to recon-
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struct the community distribution. All the parameters , M , and ν are
empirically tuned to get a small reconstruction error. The optimal solution
f ∗k (x) may not form a probability distribution; thus normalization is needed
to achieve a proper probability distribution. The relation between those
parameters and reconstruction error is analyzed in the following section.
2.2.5 Error Bound on Community Distribution
Reconstruction
If all the constraints in Equations (2.9) and (2.10) are satisfied, the error
bound of the reconstruction is given as
||f ek(x)− f ∗k (x)||2 ≤
√
2{A(ν)}−1/2M1/(1+2ν)2ν/(1+2ν) (2.14)
A(ν) = (2ν)1/(1+2ν) + (2ν)−2ν/(1+2ν) (2.15)
The reconstruction error bound in Equation (2.14) depends on , M , and
ν. From Equation (2.14), we observe that the larger the , the larger the
reconstruction error’s upper bound. We can rewrite Equation (2.9) as follows
to observe the trade-off between the noise variance and the reconstruction
error:
||Hf ek(x)− fk(y)||2 = ||fk(n) ∗ f ek(x)− fk(n) ∗ fk(x)||2 (2.16)
= ||fk(n) ∗ (f ek(x)− fk(x))||2 (2.17)
≤ ||fk(n)||2||f ek(x)− fk(x)||1 (2.18)
Equation (2.18) is obtained from Equation (2.17) using Young’s inequality.
Note that  is chosen so that Equation (2.9) is satisfied; therefore, we can
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tighten the condition on  such that
||Hf ek(x)− fk(y)||2 ≤  ≤ ||fk(n)||2||f ek(x)− fk(x)||1 (2.19)
Then the error bound in (2.14) can be written as
||f ek(x)− f ∗k (x)||2 ≤
√
2{A(ν)}−1/2 ×M1/(1+2ν) ×
×||fk(n)||2ν/(1+2ν)2 × ||f ek(x)− fk(x)||2ν/(1+2ν)1 (2.20)
This equation gives us a good approximation of the community reconstruc-
tion error based on the noise distribution. The term ||fk(n)||2 is the noise
energy, and represents the sum of all the noise from all users at time instance
k. The term ||f ek(x)− fk(x)||1 is the sum of the difference between the true
community distribution at time k and the empirical distribution constructed
from all the community data points at time k, which is very small. We call
this term the community sampling error. The community sampling error de-
pends on the number of the users in the community, N . A larger N implies
a smaller community sampling error and vice versa. Thus, the larger the
noise energy, the higher the reconstruction error; and the larger the number
of users in the community, the lower the reconstruction error. Hence, for
a large enough community, a good compromise may be achieved between
privacy (which we relate to noise energy) and reconstruction error.
In Section 2.2.3, we mentioned improving the privacy by multiplying the
noise by a factor A. For simplicity, first consider the case when A is a
constant. Note that ||Afk(n)||2 = A||fk(n)||2. Therefore the reconstruction
error in Equation (2.20) is scaled by a factor of A2ν/(1+2ν). If A is a finite
random variable, then the bound becomes ||Afk(n)||2 = δ(A)||fk(n)||2, where
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δ(A) is a number whose value depends on the distribution of A. In both cases,
the reconstruction error is scaled by a factor which can be estimated.
2.2.6 Privacy and User Data Reconstruction
In this section, we will analyze the level of user privacy achieved using our
proposed perturbation algorithm. Many methods have been proposed to
measure privacy. For example, in [6], privacy is measured in terms of con-
fidence intervals. In [7], a measure of privacy using mutual information is
suggested. However, the above methods do not take the data model as well
as the exploitation method into account. In fact, privacy breaches are dif-
ferent depending on the exploitation method employed by the adversary. In
this work, we quantify privacy by analyzing the degree to which actual user
data can be estimated from perturbed data using methods that take advan-
tage of data correlations such such as principal component analysis (PCA)
and spectral filtering. Other possible estimation methods such as maximum
mean squared estimation (MMSE) are also discussed.
First, consider traditional filtering methods such as PCA and spectral fil-
tering. These methods work based on following assumptions:
• Additive noise is time-independent and is independent of user data.
• Noise variance is small compared to the signal variance.
With our proposed perturbation scheme, both assumptions are violated.
The noise is generated from a known model but with unknown parameters,
thus noise points are correlated. In addition, the noise and user data are gen-
erated from the same model. The noise variance is not necessarily small since
it can be amplified by a factor A as discussed above. The filtering techniques
require prior knowledge about the noise in order to do accurate estimation.
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In our scheme, on the other hand, one does not know the noise distribution
for any single user, since it is a function of the specific model parameters
chosen, which remain private. We only know the distribution of such pa-
rameters over the community, but not their specific instances for any given
user. Therefore, it is expected that the filtering techniques cannot reveal the
user data with high accuracy. It is empirically shown in Section 2.3 that the
PCA method is not successful in reconstructing user data. Other methods
(not shown) present similarly poor reconstruction. Very little information is
breached.
A better way to estimate user data is to estimate the user parameters
only since the model is known. MMSE is one of the most common methods
to estimate parameters given the model. Assuming that the user data is
generated by g(k, θx, ux), the noise is generated by an approximated model
ga(k, θn, un) and the perturbed data is the sum of the y = g(k, θx, ux) +
ga(k, θn, un). The parameter estimation using MMSE is defined as follows:
(θ∗, u∗) = argmin
(θ,u)
||y − g(k, θ, u)||2 (2.21)
We consider the case when the noise is generated by a well approximated
model. In this case, the perturbed data has the same dynamics as the user
data and hence can be approximated by y˜ = g(k, θy, uy) with very small error
δ = ||y˜ − y||. Then the optimal solution for Equation (2.21) is (θ∗, u∗) =
(θy, uy). Thus, the error between the user parameters and the MMSE is
||(θy, uy)−(θx, ux)||. In order to make it big, the set of possible noise streams
must be large. If the above assumption holds and the data model is well
approximated, then our approach is robust to MMSE attacks.
However, if an ill approximated data model (or a totally different model)
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is used to generate the noise stream, user data may be revealed. A malicious
server may use this method to exploit the user parameters. In this case,
instead of using the MMSE method defined above, the malicious server may
use a slightly different estimation as:
(θ∗, u∗, θ˜∗, u˜∗) = argmin
θ,u,θ˜,u˜
||y − g(k, θ, u)− ga(k, θ˜, u˜)||2 (2.22)
In the estimation above, the malicious server tried to estimate both the
parameters of the client and also the parameters of the noise. Because there is
a modeling mismatch, the above estimation may give a good approximation
of the user data.
Similarly, a malicious server may send a good data model, but with a
very small set of parameters. With this type of attack, using the parameters
distribution sent by the server, the client can only generate a very small set
of noise streams. Thus, the server can extract user data from the perturbed
data stream since the noise is predictable. We devised a method, which can
be used on the user side, to effectively verify that the noise model announced
at the server and its parameters are adequate. This is discussed in Section
2.2.7. Users may choose not to share their data if bad noise models or bad
parameter distributions are detected, as will be shown next.
2.2.7 Model and Parameter Verification
In Section 2.2.6, we have shown that a malicious server can deliberately
announce a “bad” noise model in order to reveal user data by using spe-
cial estimation techniques. In this work, we proposed a method to detect
if a model along with its parameter distribution is malicious or not. The
detection is based on the following observation: the user data should be a
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typical realization of the model which also means that the probability of the
parameters of the user data, as sampled from the noise model parameter
distribution, is high.
Given the model g(k, θ, u), the distribution fn(θ), fn(u) (both publicly
announced to the community by the aggregation server) and user data xi,
we propose a two-step model and parameter verification:
• Estimate the user data parameters by minimizing the following quadratic
function:
(θi, ui) = argmin
θ,u
||xi − g(k, θ, u)||2 (2.23)
The minimization problem in Equation (2.23) can be solved numerically
by algorithms such as gradient descent or quasi Newton. Observe that
if the given model is an ill approximation of the data model, then
the error in this estimation is high. Thus to check the validity of the
model it is required that the estimation error be less than a predefined
threshold p1, which depends on the mean and variance of user data,
(i.e. ||xi − g(k, θi, ui)|| ≤ p1). Using triangular inequality, it can be
easily shown that
min(|||xi|| − ||g(k)||min|, |||xi|| − ||g(k)||max|)
≤ ||xi − g(k, θi, ui)|| ≤ p1 (2.24)
In Equation (2.24), ||g(k)||min and ||g(k)||max are the minimum and
maximum norms of g(k) over all possible noise curves. For each user,
||xi||, ||g(k)||min, and ||g(k)||max are known. Hence this equation gives
the user a lower bound for p1. It is empirically shown that a good
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bound is usually within 10% of this estimated bound.
• Finding noise model parameters that approximate the user data is not
sufficient. The parameters that are obtained should not lie at the
very tail of the parameter distribution sent by the server. If this hap-
pens, it would mean that either the user is anomalous (e.g., a very
overweight person) or the server is not sending a representative dis-
tribution. The validity of the parameter distribution is checked by
verifying if the probability of (θi, ui) is larger than a threshold (i.e.
P (θi, ui) = fn(θi)fn(ui) ≥ p2).
A disadvantage of this approach is that individuals whose data are anomalous
will not know to trust the server even if the server was trusted. In a social
setting, by contacting their peers, however, such individuals may be able to
disambiguate the situation.
2.2.8 Context Privacy
Thus far, we have developed a general data perturbation technique that
preserves an individual user’s privacy for time-series data. We observe that
the privacy is preserved in the sense that the values and trend of user data
are not revealed (and are hard to infer). Another important aspect of privacy
is context privacy . For example, data measurements are associated with a
given time and place. Sharing data (e.g., on city traffic), even in perturbed
form, still puts the user at a given time at a particular location. In this work,
we do not contribute to context privacy research. Traditional approaches to
solve the problem typically rely on omitting some fields from the data shared
or not answering queries for data (even in perturbed form) unless they are
appropriately broad. For example, a user may reveal that they were on a
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particular city street at 11:00 a.m. on a Wednesday but not reveal which
Wednesday it was. This could be enough to achieve a level of privacy and
at the same time satisfy the statistical need of the aggregation server, say, if
the statistic being computed is that of traffic density as a function of time
of day and day of week. The policy used for blanking-out parts of the data
fields shared to protect context is independent from our techniques to protect
data. Context privacy policies are beyond the scope of this work.
2.3 Evaluation
In this evaluation section, we present two case studies: a diet tracker and
a traffic analyzer. Our privacy algorithms are implemented on PoolView,
a framework for developing participatory sensing applications. In both the
case studies, when an individual user connects to the information distillation
server of the corresponding service for community statistics, the server sends
an HTTP POST request to the user’s personal storage server asking for the
requisite data. The request is intercepted by the user’s privacy firewall,
which validates the request by first authenticating it to ascertain if it is from
the correct server and then if that server has valid access rights to the data
requested. Data are then shared in a perturbed manner. We will first discuss
the results from the traffic analyzer case study followed by the diet tracker.
2.3.1 Traffic Analyzer
The traffic analyzer case study is motivated by the growing deployment of
GPS devices that provide location and speed information of the vehicles that
they are deployed in. Such data can be used to analyze traffic patterns in
a given community (e.g., average speed on a given street between 8:00 a.m.
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and 9:00 a.m.). Analysis of patterns such as rush hour traffic, off-peak traffic,
average delays between different key points in the city as a function of time of
day and day of the week, and average speeding statistics on selected streets
can shed light on traffic safety and traffic congestion status both at a given
point in time and historically over a large time interval.
With the above in mind, note that the aim of this evaluation section is to
study the performance of the perturbation techniques. It is not the goal of
this work to actually study traffic comprehensively in a given city. Hence, we
picked two main streets whose traffic characteristics we would like to study
for illustration. To emulate a community of users, the author enlisted the
help of colleagues in driving on these streets multiple times (in our exper-
iments, we took turns driving these streets at different times of day). We
collected data for a community of 30 users. We used a Garmin Legend [24]
GPS device to collect location data. The device returns a track of GPS coor-
dinates. The sampling frequency used in our experiments was 1 sample every
15 seconds. Each trip represented a different user for our experimentation
purposes. The stretch of each of the two roads driven was about 1.3 miles.
Data was collected in the morning between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 p.m. as
well as in the evening between 4:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m.
In a more densely deployed system, the assumption is that data will be
naturally available from different users driving over the period of weeks on
these city streets at different times of day. Such data may then be shared
retroactively for different application purposes. For example, individuals
interested in collecting data on traffic enforcement might collect and share
speeding statistics on different city streets or freeways they travel (e.g., what
percentage of time, where, and by how much does traffic speed exceed posted
signage). Such statistics may be useful when an individual travels to a new
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destination. Since speeding is a private matter, perturbation techniques will
be applied prior to sharing.
For the purposes of this work, we shall call the two streets we collected data
from Green Street and University Avenue. The aggregation server divides
city streets into small segments of equal length. The average speed on each
segment is calculated from perturbed user data.
2.3.1.1 Generating the Noise Model
In order to employ our perturbation scheme, we need a noise model. Since
the GPS data is collected with a very low frequency (1 sample every 15
seconds), speed may change dramatically on consecutive data points. Figure
2.1 shows the real speed curve of one user on Green Street in the morning.
We model the speed curve of each user as the sum of several sinusoidal signals
(observe that any waveform can be expressed a sum of sinusoids by Fourier
transform). For simplicity, we chose to use six sinusoids that represent the
common harmonics present in natural speed variations of city traffic. The
noise model is therefore as follows:
f(k) = a0 +
6∑
i=1
ai sin(bi ∗ k + ci) (2.25)
The speed model in Equation (2.25) is characterized by 19 parameters.
Once the model for the speed is obtained, we need to model the distribution
of all 19 parameters such that the speed stream generated by this model
has the same dynamics as the real speed curves. The service developer will
collect a few speed measurements empirically (which is what we did), take
that small number of real speed curves, and use an MMSE curve fitting to
find the range of each parameter. This approach is used by us to obtain the
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distribution of the parameters. The distribution of each parameter was then
chosen to be a uniform within the range obtained. A sample of speed curves
is shown in Figure 2.1.
Having produced an approximate noise model, the aggregation server an-
nounces the model information (structure and parameter distribution) to
the users. Participating users use this information to choose their private
noise parameters and generate their noise streams using client-side software
(which includes a generic function generator in the privacy firewall). Each
user’s individual speed data is perturbed by the given noise and sent to the
aggregation server when the user connects to the server. Typical perturbed
data is shown in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1: Real speed, noise, and perturbed speed curves for a single user
2.3.1.2 Reconstruction Accuracy
To show reconstruction accuracy using the community reconstruction method
developed in Section 2.2.3, the computed community average speed curve for
each street is presented in Figure 2.2. Even with a very small community
population (17 users), the community average reconstruction still provides a
fairly accurate estimate (the average error at each point is 1.94 mph).
Next, we plot the community average reconstruction accuracy versus the
scaling factor A and community population N , which is shown in Figure 2.3a.
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Figure 2.2: Reconstructed community average speed vs. distance compared
to the real community average for a population of 17 users
First, we examine the reconstruction error with respect to the scaling factor
A chosen from {1, 10, . . . , 100}. It is theoretically shown in Section 2.2.3
that the reconstruction accuracy increases linearly with A2ν/(1+2ν). Thus, we
should expect a linear error curve. This is verified in Figure 2.3a. The errors
computed in this work are normalized by dividing mean squared error by
the number of data points; this can be seen as the average error for each
reconstructed point. In this experiment, if A = 80 then the normalized
error is 8, which is about one fourth of the average speed. This might be
unacceptable in some applications, so the scaling factor must be used with
care.
Next, we examine the reconstruction error versus the community popu-
lation. Since our actual collected data was limited, we emulated additional
user data by doing random linear combinations of data from real users. Fig-
ure 2.3b shows the normalized reconstruction error versus the community
population. In this experiment, the scaling factor is fixed at A = 1. We
observe that the error decreases exponentially with the number of users. In
addition, the error due to community population is small in comparison with
the error due to the scaling factor A. This suggests that our proposed recon-
struction method can be used in a small community. In the above graphs, we
plot the reconstruction errors for both Green Street and University Avenue.
34
0 20 40 60 80 100
0
2
4
6
8
10
Scaling Factor A
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
Green Street
University Avenue
(a)
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
Community Population
N
or
m
al
iz
ed
 E
rro
r
 
 
Green Street
University Avenue
(b)
Figure 2.3: Reconstruction error vs. (a) scaling factor A and (b) population
of community
In our next experiment, we compute the reconstructed community speed
distribution at a given location on University Avenue. In order to estimate
the distribution with high accuracy, it is required that the community popu-
lation be large. Therefore, we emulated additional user data using the same
method as described in our previous experiment. The real community speed
distribution is shown in Figure 2.4a. The reconstruction method discussed
in Section 2.2.4 is used to estimate the community speed distribution from
the perturbed community data, with the result being shown in Figure 2.4b.
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Figure 2.4: (a) Real and (b) reconstructed community speed distributions
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2.3.1.3 A Privacy Evaluation
In this section, we will analyze the degree to which an individual user data can
be revealed in our scheme. Specifically, we choose the PCA method to obtain
an estimate of the original user data from the perturbed data. The PCA
method is usually very effective in reconstructing data from the perturbed
data with additive noise. In addition, filtering techniques such as spectral
filtering [8] are a special case of PCA with different way of choosing principal
dimensions. Figure 2.5 shows the real speed data of one user, the perturbed
data, and the reconstructed data. We observe that the reconstructed data is
closer to the perturbed data and has very little correlation with the real data.
We can conclude from this plot that PCA is not an effective exploitation
method against our perturbation scheme.
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Figure 2.5: PCA based reconstruction of average speed of a single user
2.3.1.4 Coping with Malicious Servers
This section evaluates the techniques we developed in Section 2.2.7 to deal
with malicious servers. A malicious server is one that “cheats” by announcing
a poor noise model in an attempt to get poorly perturbed user data such
that user privacy can be violated. Since the server shares both noise model
structure and parameter distributions, “cheating” can occur either by sending
the wrong noise model (a model of an incompatible structure) or by sending
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a good model with bad parameter distributions (so that the noise curve can
be easily estimated).
First, we consider an instance of a malicious server that sends a wrong noise
model (for traffic data). Assume that the model the server sends to users is a
linear one, y(k) = a∗k+b, where a and b are two random variables uniformly
distributed between -0.1 and 0.1. With this linear model, the server can
easily compute an individual user’s data trends. At the user side, the model
is checked using the malicious server detection method discussed in Section
2.2.6. It is important for the user to choose the appropriate threshold p1
(the acceptable fitting error). Too small a p1 may cause the server to always
be rejected (including good servers). Too large a p1 may cause malicious
server noise models to be accepted. In Figure 2.6a, the acceptance rate
of both malicious servers and good servers is plotted against the threshold
p1. We observe from the above figure that a safe threshold for p1 in this
case is 0.1 ≤ p1 ≤ 0.3. We can estimate p1 using the method proposed
in Section 2.2.7. For the “good” model, ||g(k)||min and ||g(k)||max can be
computed since we know the range of all parameters, ||g(k)||min = 0.616 and
||g(k)||max = 1.508. The data of the user in this experiment has the norm of
||x|| = 1.269. Thus an estimate of p1 = 0.23 is a good one.
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Figure 2.6: Evaluations of coping with a malicious server
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Second, consider a malicious server that sends a noise model of acceptable
structure but with a bad parameter distribution. In this experiment, the
distribution of all 19 parameters of our multi-sinusoid noise model is chosen
to be Gaussian with the same means as a “good” model, but a very small
variance σ = 0.1. Because σ is very small, the parameters drawn from this
distribution are almost the same as their means. Hence the noise curve can
be easily predicted in most cases. Figure 2.6b shows the acceptance rate of
both good server and malicious server versus the value of threshold p2 (on the
probability that the user data may have come from the server supplied noise
model). For computational convenience, the log of the actual probability is
used as the threshold. A lower threshold is more permissive in that it accepts
models that do not fit user data with high probability. From the figure, the
safe range for the threshold is −50 ≤ p2 ≤ −5, which is very wide. Thus
choosing a good p2 is easier than choosing a good p1.
2.3.1.5 Coping with Malicious Users
Finally, we analyze the effect of malicious users on the accuracy of commu-
nity average reconstruction. Observe that there is fundamentally no way
to ascertain that the user-supplied sensory data is accurate. In the weight-
watchers case, for instance, even if the scale could somehow authenticate the
user and even if the system could authenticate the scale, there is nothing to
prevent the user from climbing on the scale with a laptop or other materials,
causing the reading to be incorrect. The system will work only if some mo-
tivation exists in the community to find out the real community data. We
assume that for a group of self-selected participants genuinely interested in
the overall statistic, such a motivation exists. The question is, how many
malicious users (who purposely falsify their data) will the statistic withstand
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before becoming too inaccurate?
For this purpose, we generate a big community (N = 1000) and change the
number of malicious users. Each malicious user generates their data accord-
ing to a uniform distribution between 0 and R. We are also interested in how
the range of malicious data affects the reconstruction accuracy. Figure 2.7
plots the reconstruction error versus the percentage of malicious users for dif-
ferent ranges. The results show that the range reconstruction error increases
linearly but very slowly with the percentage of malicious users. In addition,
the range of the malicious data has no effect on the reconstruction error.
Thus, malicious users impose very little impact on the overall community
reconstruction.
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Figure 2.7: Reconstruction error vs. number of malicious users
2.3.2 Diet Tracker
The diet tracker case study is motivated by the numerous weight watchers
and diet communities that exist today. An individual on a particular diet
monitors his/her weight on a periodic basis, perhaps by taking a weight mea-
surement once a day. This individual would likely be interested in comparing
her weight loss to that of other people on a diet in order to get feedback re-
garding the effectiveness of the diet program she is following. However, the
person would like to do it in such a manner that her weight data remains
39
private.
In the Traffic Analyzer application, to the extent of the author’s knowledge,
there is no good speed model for a vehicle on a city road. Thus, the speed
is modeled in a semi-empirical way. However, in many other applications,
accurate data models are well known and hence can be used to provide more
privacy. The Diet Tracker application is one such example. The weight of
a person on a diet is a non-linear model [22] and is described by Equations
(2.1) and (2.2). The above equations are used to generate the noise stream.
In our deployment, we recorded the weight of a single user over the course
of 60 days, once each day. We generate the parameters for a typical user
based on the data from our deployment and use these to emulate multiple
users.
The parameters for this model include λk, β and W0. The range of λ and
β can be found in [22]. The range of the initial weight W0 can be taken as
the weight of a normal adult which is from 80 pounds to 210 pounds. The
simplest distribution for these parameters is uniform within their respective
ranges. Samples of the real weight data, noise and the perturbed data are
shown in Figure 2.8.
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Figure 2.8: Real weight, noise, and perturbed weight of a single user
In this application, we demonstrate a different way of perturbing the user
data. Given the generated noise n, and the data x, the perturbed data is
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generated as follows: y = Ax + Bn + C. In this type of perturbation, A, B
and C are random variables whose distribution is known to the aggregation
server and the users. The advantage of using this type of perturbation is that
it can effectively eliminate the edge effect which is discussed in Section 2.1.
The reconstruction of the community distribution can be done in a two-step
process:
• Reconstruct the distribution of Ax by considering Bn+ C as noise.
• Reconstruct the distribution of x using the distribution of Ax found
above and the distribution of A.
The reconstruction method used in each step is the same as discussed in
Section 2.2.4. Figures 2.9a and 2.9b plot the original weight distribution and
the reconstructed weight distribution using the above method, respectively.
In this experiment, we use the same method described in the Traffic Analyzer
application to generate a big community (500 users). In this experiment, we
choose C = 0 for simplicity. A and B are drawn from uniform distribution
between 0 and 10. We observe from the figures that the reconstructed com-
munity distribution is very close to the real distribution, which suggests that
the two-step reconstruction is a also good method.
We observe from Figure 2.8 that the perturbed data contains lots of high
frequency components, so it is natural to ask if the user data can be re-
vealed using filtering techniques. We apply the PCA reconstruction method
(same method used in Traffic Analyzer application) to reconstruct an indi-
vidual user’s data. In order to employ PCA, we generated a virtual com-
munity containing 1000 users, where each user sends their perturbed data to
the aggregation server. Figure 2.10 shows the real weight data, perturbed
weight, and the reconstructed weight using PCA for a single user. The result
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Figure 2.9: (a) Real and (b) reconstructed community weight distributions
shows that the reconstructed curve fits in the same direction as the perturbed
data. Thus the filtering techniques again do not work with our perturbation
scheme.
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Figure 2.10: PCA based estimation of weight curve for a single user
In conclusion, the empirical studies in this section confirm the robust-
ness of the our perturbation technique. In the two applications, the server
has successfully recovered the community information (the average and the
distribution), and the user privacy is preserved against traditional attacks
(filtering) and specialized attacks (MMSE). Our proposed techniques also
provide means to detect malicious servers and give flexibilities by provision-
ing for multiple ways of perturbing user data.
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2.4 Conclusion
In this work, we presented the perturbation algorithms for stream privacy.
The algorithms ensure the privacy of individual user data while allowing
community statistics to be constructed. Our data perturbation techniques
allow users to perturb private measurements before sharing. The techniques
address the special requirements of time series data; namely, the fact that
data are correlated. Correlation makes it possible to attack privacy. A corre-
lated noise model is proposed and implemented. It is shown that community
data can be reconstructed with accuracy while individual user data cannot.
Although this work affirms the effectiveness of using correlated noise against
personal data exploits, the optimality of this method still remains unknown.
In the next chapter, we will discuss in detail the optimality of pertubation
techniques for single-dimensional time series. In Chapters 4 and 5, we ex-
tend the algorithms to address privacy issues when multi-modality data are
shared. In other words, multiple streams are shared by each client and such
streams may be mutually correlated.
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CHAPTER 3
OPTIMAL PERTURBATION OF
SINGLE-DIMENSIONAL TIME SERIES
This chapter extends the perturbation based privacy technique proposed in
the previous chapter by defining an information-theoretic privacy measure
and finding the optimal perturbation noise that minimize this privacy mea-
sure. Subsequently, the optimal trade-off is explored between individual user
privacy, achieved by perturbing data prior to sharing, and the correspond-
ing accuracy of computed aggregate information. The new algorithm ef-
fectively hides individual user data by optimally perturbing the time series
using knowledge of only the mean and the covariance of the original data.
We evaluate it using both synthetic data and collected real application data.
The results show that the method significantly improves the trade-off be-
tween privacy and the accuracy of reconstruction of aggregate information
from shared perturbed data.
3.1 Optimal Perturbation of Time-Series Data
Providing privacy for time-series data is much harder than doing so for a
single data point because the correlation among data points can be exploited
to gain useful information from the noisy shared data. It has been shown
in the previous chapter that correlated noise can be used to perturb time-
series data with success. However, it only shows that the scheme works
against some popular attacks (e.g., spectral filtering and Kalman filtering).
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It remains unknown whether more clever attacks can reveal original data.
In this section, we present a perturbation scheme in which the amount of
information leak can be controlled. We first introduce a privacy measure that
quantifies the amount of information leak contained in shared data. Then,
a generic time-series perturbation scheme that minimizes the information
leak, subject to a noise power constraint, is presented. Finally, we apply
the proposed generic perturbation scheme to perturb an arbitrary stationary
time-series signal such that individual data points, the average and the trend
are hidden.
3.1.1 Privacy Measure
We seek a general privacy measure that can be applied to a wide variety
of time-series signals. In this chapter, we assume that original time-series
signals are stationary. As mentioned earlier, a good privacy measure must
be independent of noise filtering methods. Another observation is that the
privacy measure must be proportional to the power of the injected noise. We
cannot perturb the data with an arbitrarily large noise that would render the
shared data useless. Thus, limiting the noise power is a necessary constraint
in defining a privacy measure. With those observations in mind, we propose
the use of mutual information between the original data and the perturbed
data as a measure for privacy.
Mathematically, let X be the user data time series, Z be the generated
noise time series, and Y = X + Z be the shared perturbed data time series.
The information about the original data X contained in the shared data Y
is the mutual information I(X, Y ) between X and Y . The mutual informa-
tion can be seen as the information leak about X given the perturbed data
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Y . We have the following definition of the minimal information leak for a
perturbation scheme:
Definition 1. The minimal information leak PoX for a given data X at
a noise power level P0 is defined as
PoX = min
Z
I(X,X + Z)
subject to PZ ≤ P0
The unit of the information leak is bits or nats. Also, note that the lower
the information leak, the better the achieved privacy. We call the noise ZoX
with power P0 that achieves the minimal information leak the optimal noise
for X. The chosen noise power P0 is used to control the trade-off between
privacy and utility. Ideally, we would like to find the value P0 for a given
utility value. This, however, is application specific and depends on the utility
function of the application. In this work, we determine the value of P0 based
on empirical historical data at the server.
Theoretically, the optimal noise for a given data time-series X can be
obtained by solving the optimization problem in the Definition 1. Unfortu-
nately, that problem is intractable because there is no general way to compute
the mutual information I(X,X + Z) for arbitrary probability distributions
of X and Z. Therefore, we relax the optimization problem by minimizing a
tight upper bound on the information leak. To find an upper bound for the
information leak, we use the following lemma [25]:
Lemma 1 (Ihara, 78). Let X, Y and Z be n-dimensional random variables
such that X is independent of Z and Y = X+Z. Let (XG, YG, ZG) be a triplet
of n-dimensional Gaussian random variables with the same covariance as the
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triplet (X, Y, Z). Then we have the following lemma:
I(X, Y ) ≤ I(XG, XG + ZG) +D(Z||ZG) (3.1)
where D(Z||ZG) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence of ZG from Z.
As D(Z||ZG) ≥ 0 with equality if and only if Z has the same distribution
as ZG, the first observation from this lemma is that the noise that achieves
the least upper bound on privacy is a Gaussian noise process. We also ob-
serve that the equality is achieved when X = XG and Z = ZG. Thus, this
upper bound on mutual information is tight. This result is very useful both
in constructing the noise and in reconstructing the community distribution
because we only need a very small number of parameters to characterize a
Gaussian process. When the perturbation noise is a Gaussian process, the
upper bound in Equation (3.1) can be computed as
I(X, Y ) ≤ I(XG, YG) = 1
2
log
det(KX +KZ)
det(KZ)
(3.2)
where KX and KZ are the covariance matrix of X and Z, respectively. Since
we assume that X and Z are both wide sense stationary (WSS) random
processes, they are characterized by their covariance matrix. The sizes of
the covariance matrices are chosen by the users such that they accurately
represent the real signals. For stationary signals, the auto-covariance function
decays geometrically. Thus, the sizes of the covariance matrices do not need
to be very large. In real applications, n ≤ 15 is generally sufficient where n
is the size of the covariance matrices.
The rest of the problem is to find the noise that achieves the least up-
per bound on information leak. First, we define the privacy achieved when
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perturbing the time series X with covariance KX with a noise Z with covari-
ance matrix KZ based on the upper bound on information leak derived in
Equation (3.2).
Definition 2. The upper bound on the information leak PX for a given data
X with covariance matrix KX of size n perturbed by a Gaussian noise process
Z with covariance matrix KZ of size n is defined as
PX = 1
2n
log
det(KX +KZ)
det(KZ)
In this definition, we divide the upper bound on information leak in Equa-
tion (3.2) by n to alleviate the effect of the size of the covariance matrix on
the privacy definition. Also, there is no constraint on the noise power level in
this definition, since it is already incorporated in KZ . In fact, the expected
noise power can be computed as
E[PZ ] =
1
n
trace(KZ) (3.3)
This definition on privacy gives us several insights on the performance of
the optimal noise. In our previous work [19], we perturb user data with
correlated noise, which has the same model as the original data. Accord-
ing to our definition of privacy, that approach is sub-optimal and achieves
the privacy of PX = 12n log det(2KZ)det(KZ) = 0.5. Furthermore, with the previous
approach, the upper bound on information leak does not change with the
noise power, making this method not good when high privacy guarantees are
needed. Next, we will present an algorithm to find the noise which minimizes
the upper bound on privacy.
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3.1.2 Construction of the Best Noise
In this section, the noise that minimizes the upper bound on information
leak is referred to as the best noise, and the upper bound on the information
leak is referred to as information leak for simplicity. To construct the best
noise, we first find the best noise’s covariance matrix K∗Z that minimizes the
privacy measure defined in Definition 2. A method to generate the noise
model from the covariance matrix will then be presented.
First, the optimization problem for finding the best noise subject to a
power constraint is as follows:
K∗Z = argmin
KZ
1
2n
log
det(KX +KZ)
det(KZ)
subject to
1
n
trace(KZ) ≤ P0
KZ  0
KZ is Symmetric Toeplitz
The constraint KZ  0 means that KZ is positive definite since it is the
covariance matrix. In previous discussion, we assumed that the noise is a
WSS process. Thus, the covariance of the generated noise is a symmetric
Toeplitz matrix. The following lemma [26] shows that the objective function
of this optimization problem is convex in KZ .
Lemma 2 (Diggavi and Cover (2001)). The function f(KZ) =
1
2
log det(KX+KZ)
det(KZ)
is convex in KZ with strict convex if KX  0.
With the convexity of the objective function, this optimization problem
becomes a semidefinite programming problem [27]. There are several off-the-
shelf solvers [28, 29] available which can solve a medium scale semidefinite
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programming problem effectively. However, the input objective function to
those solvers must be an explicit convex function. Since our objective func-
tion is not an explicit convex function, an additional step has to be taken
to transform our problem into a canonical semidefinite programming prob-
lem. The equivalent semidefinite programming problem is presented in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. The canonical semidefinite programming problem is given as
K∗Z = argmax
KZ
logdet(t)
subject to
KZ − t KZ
KZ KX +KZ

  0
1
n
trace(KZ) ≤ P0
KZ  0
KZ is Symmetric Toeplitz
Proof. First we transform the objective function:
f(KZ) =
1
2n
log
det(KX +KZ)
det(KZ)
=
1
2n
log{det(KX) det(K−1X +K−1Z )}
=
1
2n
logdet(KX) +
1
2n
logdet(K−1X +K
−1
Z )
Since KX is given, the term involved in KX in the objective function can
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be omitted. The objective function becomes
f(KZ) = logdet(K
−1
X +K
−1
Z )
= − logdet(K−1X +K−1Z )−1
Using matrix inversion lemma [30], we obtain
f(KZ) = − logdet(K−1X +K−1Z )−1
= − logdet(KZ −KZ(KX +KZ)−1KZ)
Now let t = KZ−KZ(KX+KZ)−1KZ ; the optimization problem becomes:
K∗Z = argmax
KZ
logdet(t)
subject to
t ≺ KZ −KZ(KX +KZ)−1KZ
KZ  0
1
n
trace(KZ) ≤ P0
KZ  0
KZ is Symmetric Toeplitz
Using the Schur’s complement theorem [31] yields the final optimization
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problem:
K∗Z = argmax
KZ
logdet(t)
subject to
KZ − t KZ
KZ KX +KZ

  0
1
n
trace(KZ) ≤ P0
KZ  0
KZ is Symmetric Toeplitz
The final form of the optimization problem is a canonical semidefinite
programming problem since logdet is a concave function.
Having had the covariance matrix for the best noise, we will now construct
the best noise model which is used to generate actual noise data point. It
has been shown [32] that it is possible to construct a Gauss-Markov random
process having a given covariance matrix. The model to generate the best
noise is as follows:
Z(k) =
n∑
i=1
φiZ(k − i) + k (3.4)
where k’s are zero mean i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with variance σ
2. It
is possible to determine φi and σ
2 fromK∗Z by solving a Yule-Walker equation
using the Levinson-Durbin iteration algorithm with the time complexity of
O(n2). The reader is referred to [32] for more details on constructing a
Gauss-Markov random process given its covariance matrix.
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3.1.3 Time-Series Perturbation
In a real application, users are usually concerned about privacy of real data
values, the averages and sometimes the trends. For example, individuals
sharing their bank account history usually do not want their transaction val-
ues and their average balance to be revealed. In the same manner, individuals
on a diet might not want to reveal whether they are gaining weight or not.
Thus, it is important for any perturbation algorithm to hide the individual
data values, the trends and the average of the time series.
In the previous sections, we presented a noise generation method to op-
timally perturb an arbitrary time-series. However, applying the algorithm
directly to the user data will only hide the data values effectively; the long-
term trends and the average might still be breached. To solve this problem,
we observe that the trend of a time-series can be estimated by re-sampling
the time-series at an appropriately lower sampling frequency. Therefore, we
decompose the time-series into the sum of multiple time-series components
sampled from the original data at different frequencies. The decomposition
can be done by various techniques, for example, by down-sampling the orig-
inal data or by taking the discrete Fourier transform of the original data
and using only part of the coefficients. In this chapter, we propose a simple
decomposition method using moving average window. The decomposition is
done by first constructing non-overlapping windows of samples with predeter-
mined window size. The trend is formed taking the averages of each window.
The residue is formed by subtracting the data points in each window by their
average. This process can be done multiple times to decompose the original
data into several components, each of which contains the trend on a different
time scale. Figure 3.1 demonstrates a time-series being decomposed into the
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trend and a high-frequency component.
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Figure 3.1: Time-series decomposition
The perturbation of the original time-series signal is done by perturbing the
individual components using our proposed perturbation method explained in
Section 3.1.2. The final perturbed signal is formed by combining all the per-
turbed components. It is not hard to see that this perturbation method is
equivalent to perturbing the original signal at multiple frequencies. In addi-
tion, users can have different noise powers at different frequencies, making
it possible to hide information at different time-scales to different degrees.
The choices of the number of components and their associated noise power
heavily depend on the type of shared data. In the evaluation section, we
empirically choose the values for those parameters. The existence of the op-
timal values for those parameters is still an open question. Finally, the mean
of the original signal can be hidden easily by adding a random value. The
community distribution can be reconstructed from the perturbed data and
the information about the generated noise models.
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3.2 Evaluation
In this section, we discuss the evaluation of our proposed perturbation on
both the ability to provide privacy and the performance of the reconstruction
of the community distribution. The experiments are conducted on both
simulated data and real deployment data. The results show that our proposed
method provides the best trade-off between the privacy and the community
reconstruction.
3.2.1 Simulated Data
The data used in the evaluation are generated according to an ARMA(1, 1)
model described as follows:
xk+1 = φxk + θk + k (3.5)
where φ = 0.95, θ = 0.3 and k’s are i.i.d. Gaussian random variables with
zero mean and covariance σ = 1. With the coefficients chosen above, the
generated time series is stable (i.e., satisfies the stability condition of the
perturbation algorithm). Using this model, it is possible to derive the exact
form of the covariance matrix. To be general, however, in all the experiments,
the covariance matrix will be estimated directly from the generated time-
series. The size of the estimated covariance matrix is chosen to be 15, and
the time step is 0.1 seconds in all the experiments.
In the first experiment, we generate the time series for one user accord-
ing to Equation (3.5). The signal is then decomposed into the trend and
a high frequency component. The trend and its perturbed data are shown
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in Figure 3.2a. The noise power PZ is chosen to be 1.5 PX , which clearly
seen in the figure. Figure 3.2b shows the user data and the perturbed sig-
nal after combining both the perturbed trend and perturbed high frequency
component.
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Figure 3.2: (a) Real and (b) perturbed data
Figure 3.3 shows the power spectral densities of both original data and
the generated noise. We can see that the noise power is only allocated at
the frequencies where the data power is allocated. Thus, the spectra of both
the noise and the original data overlap, making it impossible to separate
them. The insight is that, when we generate the noise, we have to solve
for its auto-covariance function. However, the power spectral density of a
time series is the Fourier transform of its auto-covariance function. Thus,
our proposed optimization framework actually solves the problem in the fre-
quency domain. We can view the perturbation problem as an optimal power
allocation problem with the utility function set to be the privacy.
Next, we evaluate the privacy guarantee by our proposed perturbation al-
gorithm and compare the results with another perturbation scheme [19] called
the Poolview scheme. Figure 3.4 shows the upper bound on information leak
at different chosen noise power levels. We observe that the information leak
decreases with noise power in our perturbation scheme while it is constant
in the other scheme, which implies that our proposed perturbation scheme
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Figure 3.3: Power spectral densities of real data and generated “noise”
provides better privacy guarantee.
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Figure 3.4: Information leak of different perturbation schemes
In the next experiment, we evaluate the real performance of three pertur-
bation schemes: our previously proposed Poolview scheme, and a Gaussian
independent noise perturbation scheme. We use the spectral filtering tech-
nique [8] to reconstruct the original data from the noisy data. We plot the
individual reconstruction error versus normalized noise power in Figure 3.5.
The result shows that the Gaussian noise perturbation scheme provides very
little privacy. Most of the additive noise is filtered. The Poolview perturba-
tion scheme provides better privacy and our proposed perturbation scheme
provides the highest privacy.
To quantify the trade-off between the individual reconstruction error and
the community reconstruction error, we further examine the community re-
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Figure 3.5: Individual reconstruction error at different noise powers
construction error at different input noise powers in Figure 3.6. The results
suggest that there is only a little difference in the community reconstruction
error between two perturbation schemes. Thus, our proposed perturbation
scheme provides a better trade-off, since it provides higher privacy at the
same input noise power and the same reconstruction accuracy.
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Figure 3.6: Community reconstruction error at different noise powers
Since the information leak is measured in bits, it is desired to understand
how this measure maps to the real individual reconstruction error. Figure 3.7
shows the individual reconstruction error versus the information leak. We
can see that the reconstruction error decays almost exponentially with the
information leak.
It is also important to understand the trade-off between the information
leak and the accuracy of the community reconstruction error, which is pre-
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Figure 3.7: Relation between the privacy measure and individual data
reconstruction error
sented in Figure 3.8. From the figure, it is easy to see that the best trade-off
point is around 0.12 bits in the information leak.
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Figure 3.8: Trade-off between privacy and reconstruction accuracy of
different perturbation schemes
3.2.2 Deployment Data
In this section, we perform experiments on real deployment data. For the
purpose of understanding vehicular traffic patterns on campus, we collected
vehicle speed data from 16 individuals over the course of three months. A
range of vehicles were used in our experiments and a total of over 1000
miles were driven by our users. The speed data was collected using OBD-II
devices [33] with the sampling intervals of 5 seconds.
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In Figure 3.9, both the real speed and the perturbed speed of a user are
shown for a short period of time. In this experiment, we add a random
Gaussian variable to the perturbed data to hide the original average speed
because it could tell people if the user was speeding or not, which is not
desired. From the figure, we can see that both the dynamics and the average
of the perturbed data are very different from the original data.
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Figure 3.9: Real speed and perturbed speed
The power spectral densities (PSD) of both original data and perturbed
data for a single user are presented in Figure 3.10. From the figure, the PSD
of the perturbed data overlaps the PSD of the original data making it hard
to separate the two signals.
0 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.1 0.120
50
100
150
200
250
Frequency (Hz)
PS
D 
[m
ph
2 /H
z]
 
 
Real Speed
Generated "noise"
Figure 3.10: PSD of real speed and perturbed speed
In the last experiment, we analyze the trade-off between privacy and com-
munity reconstruction accuracy in Figure 3.11. Observe that the reconstruc-
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tion error is higher than that in the previous experiment with synthetic data.
This is because the number of users in this experiment is lower than the num-
ber of users in the previous experiment. However, the shape of the trade-off
curve remains similar. It is not hard to see that a good trade-off point would
be at 0.2 bit of information leak with the reconstruction error of 0.05.
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Figure 3.11: Trade-off between privacy and community reconstruction
accuracy
3.3 Conclusion
In this chapter, theoretical foundations to optimally perturb time-series data
are presented. For a given noise power, our proposed algorithm provides
the highest privacy while keeping the error of the community reconstruction
acceptable. Most of all, our algorithm provides a privacy guarantee (i.e., a
bound) which, to the best of the author’s knowledge, is not possible with
previous approaches.
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CHAPTER 4
PERTURBATION OF
MULTIDIMENSIONAL TIME SERIES
Previous chapters presented different privacy techniques for single-dimensional
time-series data. In this chapter, we present theoretical foundations, a sys-
tem implementation, and an experimental evaluation of a perturbation-based
mechanism for ensuring privacy of multidimensional time-series data. We fo-
cus on privacy for location-tagged participatory sensing data while allowing
correct reconstruction of community statistics of interest (computed from
shared perturbed data). The system is applied to construct accurate traffic
speed maps in a small campus town from shared GPS data of participating
vehicles, where the individual vehicles are allowed to “lie” about their actual
location and speed at all times. An extensive evaluation demonstrates the ef-
ficacy of the approach in concealing multidimensional, correlated, time-series
data while allowing for accurate reconstruction of spatial statistics.
4.1 Joint Probability Density Function Reconstruction
The main contribution of this work lies in the algorithm to accurately re-
construct the community joint density given the perturbed multidimensional
stream data and the noise density information. Any statistical question about
the community can be answered using the reconstructed joint density. In the
traffic mapping application, for example, provided that the joint density of
the location and speed of the city is known, one can answer questions such
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as What is the average speed of a certain street? or What is the percent-
age of speeding vehicles in the city? There have been many efforts on the
community distribution reconstruction. Agrawal and Srikant [6] proposed
a Bayesian-based reconstruction of the probability distribution. In [7], the
authors use the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm to estimate one-
dimensional distribution from data perturbed with Gaussian noise. In [19],
Ganti et al. employed the Tikhonov-Miller deconvolution technique to es-
timate the community distribution. However, all of these algorithms are
developed to reconstruct a one-dimensional distribution. Hence, they do not
scale to the problem of multidimensional distribution reconstruction. In this
section, we present an iterative algorithm to estimate the discretized joint
distribution of multidimensional data streams.
Let the number of data streams that each user wants to share be M . The
shared data from each user are assumed to be drawn from a multivariate
random variable X = (X1, X2, . . . , XM); thus each data point is a length M
vector. The reconstruction algorithm does not distinguish which data points
are from which user. Therefore, we can define the set of all data points from
all users as X¯ = {x1, x2, . . . , xn}, where xi is a length M data point and n is
the total number of data points from all users.
Each data point is perturbed by adding an M -dimensional noise data
point generated from a known joint distribution fN(N1, N2, . . . , NM) which
is known to all participating users (or rather to their client-side software).
An aggregation server receives the set of n perturbed data points from all
users denoted as Y¯ = {y1, y2, . . . , yn}. We want to estimate the joint distri-
bution of X which is fX(X1, X2, . . . , XM) given the shared data Y¯ and the
knowledge of the noise distribution fN .
Let us denote the sample space of Xi as Ωi. Thus, the sample space of X
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is Ω = Ω1 × Ω2 × . . . × ΩM . In order to reconstruct the density of X, we
first discretize the the sample space Ω. The sample space of Xi is partitioned
into Ki bins (may not be uniform) denoted as {Ω1i ,Ω2i , . . . ,ΩKii }. Thus Ω
containes K = K1 ×K2 × . . .×KM M -dimensional bins in which the value
of the density function is constant. The more bins, the better the discrete
density approximates the continuous density. To simplify the notation, the
following symbols are introduced:
• ωI : the I th bin of Ω, thus Ω = ∪ωIωI .
• Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θK} : where θi = fX(X) with X ∈ ωI , is the set of all
density parameters to be estimated.
• mωI : the volume of ωI , where a proper discrete density Θ should satisfy
∑
ωI
θImωI = 1 (4.1)
To estimate Θ, our approach is to employ the maximum likelihood frame-
work. We need to find the density function parameters which maximize the
log likelihood of the data X¯ given the observations Y¯
Θˆ = argmax
Θ
log fX;Θ(X¯|Y¯ ) (4.2)
The notation fX;Θ means that the likelihood of X is computed using the
discrete distribution Θ. Unfortunately, the likelihood cannot be computed
directly at the aggregation server because only Y¯ is known while X¯ is miss-
ing. In this case, X¯ is called the missing information, and Y¯ is called the
incomplete information. One possible solution to this problem is to search
in the whole space of Θ for each possible value of X to find the pair X,Θ
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which maximizes the likelihood in Equation (4.2). This results in an unde-
sirable algorithm which is exponential in the running time and is impossible
to implement in most cases. A common procedure to solve the maximum
likelihood estimation with incomplete information is the EM algorithm [34].
The EM algorithm effectively computes the expected value of the likelihood
over all possible user data X using an approximated density Θk computed
in the previous step. Then the expected value of the likelihood is maximized
to find the maximum likelihood solution. The advantages of using the EM
algorithm are:
• The computational complexity of the algorithm is lower because it does
not search the entire space of Θ and X to maximize the likelihood in
Equation (4.2).
• Under some mild conditions [35], the algorithm is guaranteed to con-
verge to the maximum likelihood solution. Later in this section, we
provide a proof that, in this problem, the EM algorithm actually con-
verges to the true maximum likelihood solution.
To use the EM algorithm, the following auxiliary function Q(Θ|Θˆk) is
defined:
Q(Θ|Θˆk) = EX|Y
[
log fX;Θ(X¯)|Y¯ , Θˆk
]
(4.3)
The auxiliary function Q is actually the expectation of the likelihood in
(4.2) with respect to X using the density of X computed from the previous
step which is Θˆk. The EM algorithm consists of two steps:
• E-step : Given the density computed from the kth step, compute the
value of Q(Θ|Θˆk).
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• M-step : Compute Θˆk+1 = argmaxΘQ(Θ, Θˆk).
Next, we will derive a closed form expression for Q and the optimal solution
which maximizes the likelihood function, and we will analyze the convergence
of the algorithm.
Theorem 2. (E-step) The value of Q(Θ|Θˆk) is given by
Q(Θ|Θˆk) =
∑
ωI
θˆkωI log(θωI )φ
k
ωI
(4.4)
φkωI =
1
N
N∑
j=1
fN(yj − ωI)
fk
Y ;Θˆk
(yj)
(4.5)
fY ;Θˆk(yj) =
∑
ωI
fN(yj − ωI)θˆkωI (4.6)
fN(yj − ωI) =
∫
ωI
fN(yj − γ)dγ (4.7)
Proof. We begin with the expansion of the auxiliary function Q by noting
that the data points are i.i.d.
Q(Θ|Θˆk) = EX|Y
[
log fX;Θ(X¯)|Y¯ , Θˆk
]
= EX|Y
[
log
N∏
j=1
fX;Θ(xj)|yj, Θˆk
]
=
N∑
j=1
EX|Y
[
log fX;Θ(xj)|yj, Θˆk
]
=
N∑
j=1
∫
Ω
log fX;Θ(γ)fX|Y ;Θˆk(γ|yj)dγ
In the last step, the expectation is taken over all possible values of X given
the observation yi. We further expand the auxiliary function Q using Bayes’
formula and the fact that fY |X(Y |X) = fN(Y −X) because N = Y −X.
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Q(Θ|Θˆk) =
N∑
j=1
∫
Ω
log fX;Θ(γ)
fXY ;Θˆk(γ, yj)
fY ;Θˆk(yj)
dγ
=
N∑
j=1
1
fY ;Θˆk(yj)
∫
Ω
log fX;Θ(γ)fX;Θˆk(γ)fN(yj − γ)dγ
=
N∑
j=1
1
fY ;Θˆk(yj)
∑
ωI
∫
ωI
log(θωI )θˆ
k
ωI
fN(yj − γ)dγ
In the last equation, the integral over the Ω is discretized and is computed
as the sum of the integral over all subspaces ωI in which the value of the
discrete density function is constant. Also the value of fY ;Θˆk(yj) is computed
as follows:
fY ;Θˆk(yj) =
∫
Ω
fY (yj|x)fX;Θˆk(x)dx
=
∑
ωI
∫
ωI
fN(yj − x)θˆkωIdx
=
∑
ωI
fN(yj − ωI)θˆkωI (4.8)
Q(Θ|Θˆk) =
N∑
j=1
1
fY ;Θˆk(yj)
∑
ωI
θˆkωI log(θωI )
∫
ωI
fN(yj − γ)dγ
=
N∑
j=1
1
fY ;Θˆk(yj)
∑
ωI
θˆkωI log(θωI )fN(yj − ωI)
=
∑
ωI
θˆkωI log(θωI )
N∑
j=1
fN(yj − ωI)
fY ;Θˆk(yj)
=
∑
ωI
θˆkωI log(θωI )φ
k
ωI
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Theorem 3. (M-step) The value of Θˆk+1 maximizing the auxiliary function
Q(Θ|Θˆk) is given by
θˆk+1ωI =
φkωI
mωI
θˆkωI (4.9)
Proof. This is an optimization problem with a constraint which ensures that
Θ is a proper density function.
Θˆk+1 = argmax
Θ
Q(Θ|Θˆk)∑
ωI
θωImωI − 1 = 0
The Lagrangian of the optimization is given by
L(θωI , λ) = Q(Θ|Θˆk) + λ(
∑
ωI
θωImωI − 1)
=
∑
ωI
θˆkωI log(θωI )φ
k
ωI
+ λ(
∑
ωI
θωImωI − 1)
The optimized values θˆk+1ωI satisfy
∂L
∂θωI
(θˆk+1ωI ) = 0 and
∂L
∂λ
(θˆk+1ωI ) = 0:
∂L
∂θωI
(θˆk+1ωI ) =
θˆkωI
θˆk+1ωI
φkωI + λmωI (4.10)
∂L
∂λ
(θˆk+1ωI ) =
∑
ωI
θˆk+1ωI mωI − 1 (4.11)
Setting Equation (4.10) to zero yields
θˆk+1ωI = −
1
λ
1
mωI
θˆkωIφ
k
ωI
(4.12)
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Substituting (4.12) into (4.11) and setting it to zero yields
λ = −
∑
ωI
θˆkωIφ
k
ωI
= −
∑
ωI
θˆkωI
1
N
N∑
j=1
fN(yj − ωI)
fY ;Θˆk(yj)
= − 1
N
N∑
j=1
1
fY ;Θˆk(yj)
∑
ωI
θˆkωIfN(yj − ωI) (4.13)
Since Y = X +N , the density of Y is the convolution of the density of X
and N . Therefore,
fY ;Θˆk(yj) =
∫
Ω
fX;Θˆk(x)fN(yj − x)dx
=
∑
ωI
∫
ωI
fX;Θˆk(x)fN(yj − x)dx
=
∑
ωI
θˆkωI
∫
ωI
fN(yj − x)dx
=
∑
ωI
θˆkωIfN(yj − ωI) (4.14)
Substituting (4.14) into (4.13) yields λ = −1. Therefore,
θˆk+1ωI =
φkωI
mωI
θˆkωI
In the next theorem, we show that the EM algorithm for this problem
is guaranteed to converge to the maximum likelihood solution which is the
solution for (4.2). Therefore the likelihood value increases slowly as it ap-
proaches the optimal solution. A stopping condition for the algorithm is
when the likelihood difference between two consecutive steps is sufficiently
small. The pseudo-code for the EM-based reconstruction algorithm is as
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follows:
Algorithm 1 Multidimensional Density Reconstruction
Input: Perturbed data points yi, Noise distribution fN
Initialize Θ = Θ0, L0 = 0, k = 0,  > 0
repeat
for all ωI ∈ Ω do
φkωI =
1
N
∑N
j=1
fN (yj−ωI)
∑
ωI
fN (yj−ωI)θˆkωI
θk+1ωI =
φkωI
mωI
θkωI
end for
Lk+1 = Q(Θk+1|Θk) {Using Equation 4.4.}
k = k + 1
until Lk − Lk−1 < 
return Estimated Density Θk
Theorem 4. The estimated density function given by the algorithm converges
to the maximum likelihood solution Θˆ defined in the Equation (4.2).
Proof. We will first prove that Q(Θ|Θˆk) is concave in θωI . In Theorem 2, we
prove that the value of the auxiliary functionQ(Θ|Θˆk) =∑ωI θˆkωI log(θωI )φkωI ,
which is the non-negative linear combination of log(θωI ). Since log(x) is
concave in x, the non-negative linear combination of log(x) functions is also
concave. Thus Q is concave in θωI .
Wu [35] showed that the value of the likelihood increases after each iter-
ation. Because Q is concave, the iterative algorithm will finally converge to
Θˆ which maximizes the likelihood function defined in (4.2).
From Theorem 4, it follows that the EM based estimation algorithm for
this problem inherits all properties of the maximum likelihood estimation.
Since the maximum likelihood estimation is asymptotically efficient [36], the
proposed algorithm is suited for participatory sensing applications which
usually involve large amounts of data.
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4.2 Perturbation of Location and Data
Having presented a general algorithm for reconstruction of community statis-
tics, it remains to decide on the perturbation function. This question is
equivalent to choosing the noise probability density function, fN(), from
which noise samples are chosen. Perturbation is application specific, since it
depends on what is being perturbed. We consider the class of applications
where we perturb location-tagged data collected by vehicles. As a means to
experiment with privacy issues involving location-tagged data, we developed
a participatory sensing application for traffic mapping, which allows users to
share their GPS data (longitude, latitude, and speed) in a privacy-preserving
manner while ensuring that community statistics (e.g., average speed, traffic
density maps) can be accurately computed. The traffic mapping applica-
tion successfully employs the multi-stream perturbation and reconstruction
framework developed in this chapter. Our application is made possible by
the growing number of deployed GPS devices that provide location and speed
information.
In our application, individuals collect GPS longitude, GPS latitude, speed
and (coarsely discretized) time, using their own GPS devices. Once the ag-
gregation server receives perturbed data from participants, the community
joint density (i.e., the joint density of longitude, latitude and speed) is recon-
structed using the above reconstruction algorithm. Speed-related statistics
are then computed as a function of location on the map from the recon-
structed joint density. In this chapter, we present useful community statistics
that can be computed from the estimated multidimensional density such as
community average speed, speed distribution, car density, and percentage of
speeding vehicles on different streets.
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The application was deployed on top of PoolView [19], an existing archi-
tecture for participatory sensing. PoolView is a generic client-server based
architecture that enables individuals to collect, archive, and share sensor data
with a community on the client side; PoolView provides software that collects
sensor data from specific devices (e.g., Garmin GPS). We modified the Pool-
View client to use our new multidimensional data perturbation scheme. On
the server side, we implemented the multidimensional density reconstruction
algorithm and the algorithms used to estimate the aforementioned statistics.
4.2.1 The Perturbation Model
In this section, we propose an algorithm that generates fake (but realistic-
looking) vehicle traces that perturb true user location and speed in a way
that protects them from being estimated. The vehicle traces are recorded
as displacements from an origin (of a coordinate framework) that lies at
some agreed upon point in the city in question. These displacements, which
we henceforth call perturbation traces , will then be added to real routes
to generate perturbed routes. There have been many research efforts on
generating vehicle traces [37, 38, 39, 40], and we can utilize one of those
models to generate perturbation traces for our application. However, the
vehicle traces used for perturbation do not need that level of accuracy. Thus,
we develop a simplified model that generates perturbation traces using a
minimal number of simple parameters.
It is key that the perturbation traces generated resemble real traces for
the city in question. For example, in a city with a lot of curvy roads, gen-
erated perturbation traces containing only straight segments will not help
conceal the identifying characteristics of the roads actually traveled. A ro-
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bust perturbation trace generation algorithm must therefore incorporate as
many features of the actual map as possible.
Our perturbation trace generation algorithm generates traffic routes made
of sequences of straight line segments, each of a length drawn from the distri-
bution of the lengths of city blocks. These segments are at angles generated
from the distribution of city street intersection angles. This distribution
heavily favors 0◦ angles (continuing forward past an intersection) and 90◦
turns. Other angles are generated with lower probability. We ignore U-turns
because they occur with a very small probability. For speed, we use a sine
curve for each road segment that peaks in the middle of the segment and slows
down towards the beginning and end. The peak is drawn from the distribu-
tion of city street speed limits. The slowest point is a uniformly-distributed
random fraction of the peak. These traces represent displacement to actual
routes. This displacement can be scaled to control the noise variance.
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Figure 4.1: A perturbation trace generated by our algorithm
In the following example, we demonstrate the generation of a vehicular
perturbation trace and the scaling of the trace to achieve the desired variance.
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Figure 4.1 shows a perturbation trace containing 40 points generated by the
above algorithm. It is then added to a user data to form the perturbed
path. The perturbed path thus generated is very similar to the path of a real
vehicle, but is in fact fake. The real vehicle trace and perturbed vehicle trace
are plotted in Figure 4.2a. Obviously, the path no longer conforms to a map,
but the lack of individual street-identifying features in the perturbed trace
makes it hard to infer the original trace without high uncertainty. Figure
4.2b shows the perturbed path when the perturbation trace is scaled by a
factor of two.
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Figure 4.2: Real path and perturbed path (a) before and (b) after scaling
Figure 4.3 plots the real speed, generated speed (the perturbation) and per-
turbed speed over time for a random vehicle. We can see that the generated
speed curve has a similar rate of change as the real speed curve but higher
values. Thus the spectrum of both curves overlaps, making it impossible to
separate real speed from the perturbed speed.
Finally, for the purpose of reconstructing the community joint distribution,
we need the joint distribution of the generated perturbation trace (the noise).
Since it is hard to come up with an analytic solution for the joint distribution
of the noise, we generate this distribution numerically. First, we generate
a pool of noise data points from the model; then a non-parametric density
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Figure 4.3: Real speed, generated speed and perturbed speed
estimation with smoothing [41] is employed to estimate the joint distribution.
In this application, 5000 vehicle traces, each of which contains 40 data points,
are generated and used as input to the density estimation algorithm, which
generates the joint distribution. The density estimation is a very popular
technique in machine learning and can be used to estimate the density of
any noise model in general.
4.2.2 Achieved Privacy
In this section, we analyze the extent of privacy offered to individual user
data using our perturbation scheme. The information available to the aggre-
gation server includes the perturbed data, the noise density function (known
by the server) and the map on which the user traveled. First, note that
the reconstruction algorithm proposed in this chapter cannot be used to
reconstruct an individual’s real data from this information. Our proposed
algorithm can only reconstruct community distribution from shared data of a
reasonable number of participants. Using the available information, the ma-
licious server can employ filtering techniques to remove additive noise from
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the perturbed data. We call this kind of attack a filtering attack.
In this chapter, we analyze a filtering attack which applies a Wiener filter
to remove additive noise from perturbed data. The Wiener filter uses the
noise density information to filter the noise from perturbed data. One im-
portant assumption that the Wiener filter makes is that the noise samples
are independent. However, this assumption fails because the noise samples
generated by our algorithm are correlated, which makes the estimated data
traces follow the perturbed path instead of the real path. For demonstration,
we perturb a real user location trace with both correlated noise generated by
our algorithm and independent Gaussian white noise and then perform the
Wiener filter on both perturbed data set.
The result of the Wiener attack in the case of Gaussian white noise is shown
in Figure 4.4a. The reconstructed path is very close to the real path and the
reconstruction error is less than one block, which means that the attacker
can easily figure out the place where the user has been. Figure 4.4b shows
the real path, perturbed path and reconstructed path for the perturbation
technique we developed in this chapter. We see that the reconstructed path
follows the perturbed path. Therefore, the Wiener filter attack does not
work as desired for the attacker. Users might want to increase the variance
of the generated noise to get more privacy, but the reconstruction error might
increase as well. Therefore, it is important to balance the trade-off between
privacy and accuracy.
The second type of attack considered in this chapter is the range attack.
It is possible to conduct the range attack in applications where the ranges of
both the real data and the generated noise are finite. In this case, real data
values can be inferred if boundary values of the perturbed data are observed.
For example, suppose the real speed of a vehicle is in the range [0 to 50] and
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Figure 4.4: Reconstruction of user location perturbed with different noise
model
the generated noise is also in the range [0 to 50]. If the perturbed speed is
100, the attacker knows with certainty that the true speed is 50. In general,
if the perturbed values are close to the boundary, privacy can be violated. In
applications involving GPS location as a private variable, however, this attack
is not effective. GPS location refers to a point of the globe. Perturbing that
location by a few miles is sufficient for privacy, yet the perturbed location
still refers to a point on the globe. In other words, the perturbed coordinates
always refer to a valid data point. An exception is when map information
is used to infer noise. For example, at coastal areas, one may safely assume
that vehicles do not move on water, which generates a boundary on valid
locations. The map-based attack will be discussed shortly. In general, the
effect of range-based attacks can be mitigated if the noise distribution has a
long tail such that arbitrarily large values are allowed with an arbitrarily low
probability. (Many distributions, including Gaussian, have this property.) In
this case, the range is infinite. There is no maximum value for the perturbed
signal that can be used to breach privacy.
Another popular type of attack against additive-noise perturbation tech-
niques is the leak attack [42]. In this type of attack, the attacker may be able
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to estimate the seed of the pseudo random number generator which generates
the noise curve if he can guess a few true data values. Then this seed can be
used to generate the noise curve used by the user since the noise distribution
is known. However, with our perturbation scheme, this attack is not possible
because we only use the random number generator to generate the model pa-
rameters (e.g., number of turns, speed of each segment). The additive noise
is then generated using those parameters and the model developed earlier in
this section.
A vulnerability of our perturbation scheme is that it is possible to com-
bine the real map with a clever estimation technique to estimate the most
likely traveled path. We call this attack scheme a map-based attack. At this
moment, it is still unknown if there exists a good map-based attack against
our perturbation scheme. In this chapter, we argue that finding an efficient
map-based attack is hard. One possible way to conduct the map-based at-
tack is to look at the sequence of the turning angles in the GPS trajectory
data. Since the probability that the noise angle and the real angle cancel
out is pretty small, the turning angles from the perturbed data contain some
information about the real turning angles. Combining with the map, it is
possible to find the most probable traveled path. It is not easy, however,
to find the likelihood of the real turning angle given the perturbed path.
Because the perturbed path is created by adding the coordinates of the real
path and the noise path, the angle in the perturbed path is dependent not
only on the angle of both the real and noise paths but also on their mag-
nitudes. A demonstration is given in Figure 4.5. In the figure, X1, X2, X3
represent the real path, Z1, Z2, Z3 represent the noise path and Y1, Y2, Y3 are
the perturbed path. Although the real path is straight and the noise contains
a right angle, the perturbed path contains an acute angle. It is not hard to
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see that the resulting angle depends on both the angles and the magnitudes.
In the upcoming sections, we only evaluate the immunity of our perturbation
scheme against the filtering attacks.
Figure 4.5: Addition of real path and noise path
4.3 Simulation Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the traffic mapping applica-
tion with simulated data. The advantage of using simulated data is to give
total control over traffic parameters (e.g., average community speed, speed
map), which is hard to accurately measure in a real application. In addi-
tion, vehicular traces can be generated for a large number of “virtual” users,
making it possible to evaluate the accuracy of the reconstruction algorithms.
We also evaluate the accuracy computation of the community average speed
using the reconstructed density in this section.
We use the ONE (Opportunistic Network Environment) [43] simulator to
generate artificial traces of vehicle movements in a small city setup. The map
used in this simulation is a part of Helsinki and is distributed with the ONE
simulator. The simulator supports map based movement models that can
import map data and constrain vehicle movement to the streets and roads
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of the imported map. Once the map data are loaded by the simulator, the
mobility works as follows. Each vehicle starts at a random position on the
map and picks a random destination to visit. The shortest path from the
source to the destination on the map is computed, and the vehicle moves
along that path with a speed (for each path segment) sampled from a pre-
specified random distribution. After the destination has been reached, the
vehicle waits for a random wait time and then moves to another random
destination.
Our goal is to make the data from the simulator as realistic as possible.
The input map for the simulator is extracted from a real map and is shown in
Figure 4.6 with the X and Y coordinates ranging from 0 to 4000 meters and
0 to 3600 meters respectively. Vehicle speeds are chosen to be Gaussian with
mean 30 mph and standard deviation of 10 mph. The simulator generates
at most 25 vehicles at a time, chooses the origin and destination, plans the
shortest route and simulates the behavior of the vehicles along the route.
When a vehicle reaches its destination, a new origin, destination pair for
the vehicle is chosen. Trip data, including X and Y coordinates and vehicle
speed, are sampled at a frequency of 1 Hz, and are stored in an external
file for later use. The simulated data are then perturbed with perturbation
traces generated by the algorithm discussed in Section 4.2.1. The perturbed
data are then submitted to the aggragation server.
We collect data from 120 users, each of which contains 80 data points, from
the simulation. In order to reconstruct the community joint distribution, we
first have to specify the range of each dimension and the number of bins
in each dimension. Those parameters are summarized in Table 4.1. In this
simulation, we discretize the location in 100 m × 100 m bins which is fine
enough to capture the street information. For more accurate reconstruction
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Figure 4.6: The map used in simulation
of the joint density, more bins in each dimension might be needed but it would
require more user data points and computational time. In this specific traffic
application, we are only interested in the density values corresponding to the
street locations. Our proposed algorithm allows us to do the reconstruction
on those bins only, thus significantly reducing the time complexity of the
algorithm.
Table 4.1: Parameters for the reconstruction
Parameter range of X range of Y range of V
Value 0 - 4000 (m) 0 - 3600 (m) 0 - 60 (mph)
Parameter X bins Y bins V bins
Value 40 36 60
Table 4.2: Noise variance in each data set
Parameter stddev of X (m) stddev of Y (m) stddev of V (mph)
Dataset 1 100 100 4
Dataset 2 500 500 36
Dataset 3 900 900 60
Dataset 4 1500 1500 76
Dataset 5 3000 3000 100
In the first experiment, we study the accuracy of the density reconstruction
algorithm under various noise variance. The application must achieve high
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reconstruction accuracy at a reasonably high noise variance level in order to
provide sufficient privacy to users. To achieve this goal, we perturbed the
simulation data using five different noise variances shown in Table 4.2.
We define the accuracy of the density reconstruction as a function of the
average accuracy of all the bins:
r =
1
K
K∑
i=1
(
1− |θi − θˆi|
θi
)
(4.15)
In Equation (4.15), r is the computed accuracy, θi is the true discrete density
parameter, θˆi is the estimated density parameter. θˆi is obtained by feeding
the real density using real user data points to the density estimation algo-
rithm.
The accuracies of the reconstructions as the function of the number of
data points and noise variance are shown in Figure 4.7. The figure shows
five different curves corresponding to the five datasets described above. The
X axis is the number of data points, which varies from 120 points to 1200
points with 120-point increments. In the results, Dataset 1 achieves highest
accuracy while Dataset 5 achieves lowest accuracy.
Next, we evaluate the achieved privacy for each dataset presented in Table
4.2. We assume that the attacker uses a Wiener filter to estimate vehicle
traces of individuals from perturbed data and the noise distribution. Besides
correlated noise, trip data are also perturbed with Gaussian noise with the
same standard deviation for comparision purpose. We perform the estima-
tion on the perturbed vehicle trace of all users and compute the average
reconstruction error which is presented in Table 4.3 below.
From Table 4.3, the reconstruction error for the vehicle traces perturbed
with correlated noise is very high as opposed to the Gaussian case in which
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Figure 4.7: Percentage reconstruction accuracy as a function of number of
data points and noise variance
Table 4.3: Reconstruction error of individual data
Dataset Correlated Noise (m) Gaussian Noise (m)
Dataset 1 334.5 145.0
Dataset 2 1329.5 153.4
Dataset 3 1942.4 189.8
Dataset 4 3573.6 218.1
Dataset 5 4901.1 223.5
the error is small. With Dataset 1 (the noise covariance is small) the recon-
struction of individual data is still high (about 3 blocks) which means good
privacy is achieved. Also, with Dataset 5, although the reconstruction error
of individual data is huge (about 40 blocks), the community distribution can
still be accurately reconstructed (above 96%).
In the last experiment, we demonstrate the estimation of the community
average speed using the joint distribution estimated in the first experiment.
In addition, we also want to study the effect of the number of iterations on
the accuracy of reconstruction. To compute the community average speed
from the community joint distribution f(X, Y, V ), we first compute the speed
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density f(v)
f(v) =
40∑
x=1
36∑
y=1
f(x, y, v)∆XY (4.16)
Equation (4.16) is the marginalization of the discrete joint density over
X and Y dimensions, where ∆XY = (4000/40) × (3600/36) is the area of
a two dimensional bin XY . Then the average speed v¯ is computed as v¯ =∑60
v=1 vf(v).
The result of the experiment is shown in Figure 4.8. Although Dataset 5
provides users with the highest privacy, the reconstructed average speed is
still close to the true value. Another important observation from the graph
is that the density reconstruction algorithm requires a very small number of
iterations to converge. Results from 5 datasets show that 10 to 15 iterations
are sufficient. The accuracy of the algorithm almost does not change after 20
iterations. In the next section, we evaluate the performance of the application
using deployment data.
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Figure 4.8: Community average speed versus number of iterations
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4.4 Deployment Data
In this section, we evaluate the traffic monitoring application with real de-
ployment data. The data are collected by driving on all the streets within
an area shown in Figure 4.9. There are a total of 15 users; each user drives
the streets at will for 10 minutes. During the drive, we use a Garmin Legend
[24] GPS device to record location and speed information. The sampling
frequency of the device is 15 Hz which is enough to record changes in the
location and speed since the speed limit in the area is 25 mph.
Figure 4.9: Map used to collect data
At the aggregation server side, to do the reconstruction, we need to specify
the reconstructed region and the number of bins in each region. The recon-
struction parameters are summarized in Table 4.4. For location, we divide
each axis into 30 bins, each of width 0.01 mile, which is about the width of
a street. This is important because we want to estimate the speed down to
the resolution of a street. This can be done by looking at the specific bins
corresponding to the target street.
In the first experiment, we study the density reconstruction accuracy as a
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Table 4.4: Parameters for the reconstruction
Parameter range of X) range of Y range of V
(1/100 mile) (1/100 mile) (mph)
Value 0 - 300 0 - 300 0 - 25
Parameter X bins Y bins V bins
Value 30 30 30
function of the number of data points used for reconstruction. We want to
answer the question of how many data points we need to achieve a desired
accuracy. Similar to the case of simulation data, we do the perturbation of the
data with five different noise data sets, each of which has a different variance.
The details of the noise datasets are presented in Table 4.5. The standard
deviation of the noise specified in the table is comparable to multiples of
the block length (about 75/100 mile), We run the density reconstruction
algorithm multiple times, each time with a different number of data points.
The data points are randomly picked from the total pool of data points
contributed by all users. The number of data points taken for reconstruction
is varied from 100 to 800.
Table 4.5: Noise standard deviation in each dataset
Parameter stddev of X stddev of Y stddev of V
(1/100 mile) (1/100 mile) (mph)
Dataset 1 45 35 5
Dataset 2 75 75 10
Dataset 3 100 100 15
Dataset 4 150 150 20
Dataset 5 300 300 30
The results of the experiment are shown in Figure 4.10. From the result,
the highest accuracy achieved is about 90% at about 800 datapoints while
the lowest accuracy is about 83% at about 160 datapoints. The number of
data points needed for a good estimate is thus surprisingly low. This can
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be explained by the observation that since the data points are uniformly
picked from the pool, there is a high chance that they scatter all over the
map, thus capturing the speed information of the whole area. This makes
the application practical in most city areas.
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Figure 4.10: Accuracy of the density reconstruction
In the next experiment, we demonstrate the estimation of the commu-
nity speed distribution. This community speed distribution can be useful in
determining the average speed in the area or computing the percentage of
speeding vehicles in that area. To compute the community speed distribu-
tion f(v), we marginalize the estimated discrete joint distribution f(x, y, v)
as follows:
f(v) =
30∑
x=1
30∑
y=1
f(x, y, v)∆XY (4.17)
where ∆XY = (300/30) ∗ (300/30) is the area of a two-dimensional bin in
XY dimension. Figure 4.11a and 4.11b show the real community speed
distribution and the estimated community speed distribution, respectively.
We see that the two speed distributions are similar except for the first bin
corresponding to zero speed. This can be explained because the density
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estimation algorithm tends to produce a smooth distribution. Thus, the
speed value of the bin is smoothed out. The percentage of speeding vehicles
in the community can be computed as the sum of bins with greater than 25
miles/hr speed. In this case the real community percentage of speeding is
about 7% while the estimated percentage of speeding is 10%, which is a good
estimate.
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Figure 4.11: Real and reconstructed speed distribution
The advantage of our proposed reconstruction algorithm is that the in-
formation about the speed at any location or any street can be estimated
from the joint distribution. In the next experiment, we show an example
of reconstructing the speed distribution on two main streets, University Av-
enue and Washington Street. Also, the percentage of speeding vehicles on
four main streets — University Avenue, Washington Street, Elm street and
Neil street — will be computed from perturbed data. First, to compute the
speed distribution on a certain street, we need to marginalize the estimated
joint distribution along the street coordinates; then the resulting distribution
is normalized to achieve a proper probability distribution. As an example,
we compute the speed distribution of University Avenue. From the map, we
know that University Avenue is on the X axis with 0 ≤ x ≤ 300, y = 0. In the
discrete distribution, corresponding bins in the X dimension are 1 ≤ xb ≤ 30
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and the bin corresponding to y = 0 is yb = 1. Thus the speed distribution of
University Avenue can be computed as
f(v) =
1∑30
x=1
∑30
v=1 f(x, 1, v)
30∑
x=1
f(x, 1, v) (4.18)
The real speed distribution and estimated speed distribution of University
Avenue and Washington Street are shown in Figure 4.12. We can see that
the reconstructed speed distributions for both streets are very close to the
real speed distributions.
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Figure 4.12: Real and reconstructed speed distribution
Finally, we compute the percentage of speeding vehicles on all four main
streets on the drive map. The percentage of speeding vehicles is computed as
the tail probability of speed distribution of each street. Very accurate results
are shown in Table 4.6. From the results, an interesting behavior of city traffic
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is that the drivers tend to go over the speed limit more on large streets (Neil
Street, University Ave) and less on small streets (Elm Street, Washington
Street). The interesting part about this statistic is that it was generated
entirely from perturbed data. Both the speed and location of individual
drivers were perturbed. Yet, very accurate estimates were computed of the
percentage of speeding vehicles at the actual locations.
Table 4.6: Percentage of speeding vehicles
Street Real % Reconstructed %
University Ave 15.60 17.89
Neil Street 21.43 23.67
Washington Street 0.5 0.15
Elm Street 6.95 8.6
4.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we present theoretical foundations for perturbation based
mechanisms for ensuring privacy while allowing correct reconstruction of
community statistics of interest. Previous data perturbation techniques fail
to ensure either privacy or correct reconstruction of community statistics in
the case of correlated multidimensional time-series data. The algorithms pro-
posed in this work allow participants to add noise to multiple correlated data
streams prior to sharing in a privacy-preserved way while making sure that
relevant community statistics are still reconstructible. A participatory sens-
ing application for traffic monitoring is developed which allows participants
to “lie” about their actual location and speed, while letting the community
estimate useful traffic statistics (e.g., speed map, percentage of speeding ve-
hicle, etc.) with high accuracy.
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CHAPTER 5
OPTIMAL PERTURBATION OF
MULTIDIMENSIONAL TIME SERIES
In Chapter 4, we show that correlated noise can be used to perturb multidi-
mensional data and propose an iterative algorithm to reconstruct the joint
distribution of the community from the perturbed data streams. In this chap-
ter, we propose a solution to the problem of finding the optimal perturbation
noise for multidimensional data as an extension to the problem proposed in
Chapter 3. We use the same privacy metric described in Chapter 3 to mea-
sure the privacy for multidimensional data and derive a framework to find
the optimal correlated noise that minimizes the privacy measure.
5.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, the need of sharing multidimensional
data streams arises in many applications. For example, in traffic analysis,
people share their location and speed over time to compute the speed map
of a particular area. It is essential to provide privacy for both speed and lo-
cation while allowing the speed map to be accurately computed. In Chapter
4, we prove that multidimensional correlated noise can be used to perturb
the data before sharing while allowing the community statistics to be re-
constructed with accuracy. However, the level of privacy provided by the
proposed algorithm is not discussed. In addition, to the extent of the au-
thor’s knowledge, there is no previous work that fully solves the problem of
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privacy of multidimensional time-series data.
In this chapter, we extend the framework for finding optimal perturbation
noise for single-dimensional time-series data to finding the optimal pertur-
bation noise for multidimensional time series. We show that the mutual
information between original data and perturbed data is still a good privacy
measure for multidimensional time-series data. Furthermore, we extend the
optimization framework in Chapter 3 to find the optimal noise that minimize
the privacy measure.
One of the challenges of extending the framework for single-dimensional
time series to multidimensional time series is how mutual information is
computed between multidimensional streams. Many works [44, 45] have an-
alyzed mutual information for multidimensional time series. The results,
however, are still complicated and hard to apply in reality. In this work, we
solve that problem by first proving that the optimal perturbation noise is
an n-dimensional Gaussian process. Furthermore, the privacy for a multi-
dimensional time-series is upper bounded by the mutual information of two
multidimensional Gaussian random processes, which is trivial to compute.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 introduces
the problem and provides a framework for finding an optimal solution to
the problem. Next, Section 5.3 evaluates the proposed algorithms on both
synthetic data and real data. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Problem Formulation and Solution
In this section, we will discuss in depth the problem of finding optimal per-
turbation noise for multidimensional time-series data and propose an opti-
mization framework for finding the optimal noise.
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5.2.1 Problem Formulation
Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be n original data streams from each user which they
want to share. Our goal is to find n optimal noise streams Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn
that will be used to perturb the original data before sharing. Let us denote
Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn be the perturbed data streams (Yi = Xi + Zi). The length
of each data stream can be different in general. Without loss of generality,
however, we can assume that they all have the same length since we can
always choose the length of the shortest data stream as the representative
length of all streams and truncate all data streams to this length.
Following our work in Chapter 3, we assume that all data streams can be
modeled as wide-sense stationary (WSS) random processes. Furthermore,
each data stream Xi can be modeled (or approximated with high accuracy)
as a stationary ARMA(pi, qi) random process [46]. This means each data
point in data stream i is a linear combination of pi data points in the past
plus a noise factor. This assumption is important in practice because it limits
the size of the covariance matrix of each data stream. However, pi might not
be known in advance in real applications. In such cases, we have to choose
pi such that it is big enough to cover the correlation within the time series.
1
We define the vector random process X = [X1, X2, . . . , Xn]. The covari-
ance matrix KX of this vector random process is a block Toeplitz matrix as
1In practice, pi is usually less than 10.
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follows:
KX =


KX1,X1 KX1,X2 . . . KX1,Xn
KX2,X1 KX2,X2 . . . KX2,Xn
. . . . . . . . . . . .
KXn,X1 KXn,X2 . . . KXn,Xn


(5.1)
In Equation (5.1), the matrix KXi,Xi is the covariance matrix of Xi of size
pi× pi and KXi,Xj is the cross covariance matrix of Xi and Xj of size pi× pj.
Note that KXi,Xi is a symmetric Toeplitz matrix while KXi,Xj is a Toeplitz
matrix. Our goal is to find the optimal n dimensional noise vector process
Z = [Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn] that provides the highest privacy for a given level of
noise energy.
We solve this problem by finding the covariance matrix for the optimal
perturbation noise first. Then we construct the model for the multidimen-
sional noise by from the optimal covariance matrix found in the previous step.
Finally, the data points for perturbing the data stream are generated using
the constructed model. The details of those steps are discussed in detail in
the following section.
5.2.2 Finding Optimal Perturbation Noise
Taking the same approach presented in Chapter 3, we define the privacy
of the multidimensional time-series as the mutual information I(X ,X + Z)
between the original data X and the perturbed data Y = X + Z. This
approach has been proven to be a good privacy metric to measure the privacy
of our proposed single-dimensional time-series perturbation technique. In
this work, we will show that an information theoretic privacy measure can
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also be used to measure privacy for multidimensional time series.
First, observe that computing the mutual information between original
data and perturbed data is not easy. In fact, there is no general method
for computing the mutual information between arbitrary random processes.
Therefore, instead of computing the mutual information directly, we find a
tight upper bound for the mutual information in general and try to minimize
it in order to minimize the information leak.
In Chapter 3, we derive a good upper bound for the mutual information
between two single-dimensional random processes. Here, notice that the
derived upper bound on privacy is still applicable for multidimensional data
because no assumptions about the type of data are made in Lemma 1. Thus,
the Lemma can be rewritten as follows:
I(X ,X + Z) ≤ I(XG,XG + ZG) +D(Z||ZG) (5.2)
In Equation (5.2), X and Z are the original data and the perturbed noise
(both are multidimensional), respectively. Also, XG and ZG, respectively, are
Gaussian random processes having the same covariance matrices as X and Z.
The operator D(.||.) represents the Kullback-Leibler distance between two
random processes. Because the Kullback-Leibler distance is non-negative,
thus the upper bound is minimize if and only if D(Z||ZG) = 0. This means
that the optimal perturbation noise must be a multidimensional Gaussian
random process. In this case, the upper bound on mutual information be-
comes much simpler:
I(XG,XG + ZG) +D(Z||ZG) ≥ I(XG,XG + ZG)
=
1
2
log
det(KX +KZ)
det(KZ) (5.3)
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Finally, minimizing the upper bound on privacy is equivalent to minimizing
the expression in the Equation (5.3). Observe that the upper bound on
mutual information described in Equation (5.3) is a decreasing function with
the power of the perturbation noise. The higher the noise power, the lower the
information leak, hence the higher the privacy. However, the higher the noise
power, the lower the utility acquired from the perturbed data. Therefore, we
cannot perturb the original data with the noise with arbitrarily high power.
Thus it is natural to impose the noise power constraint while minimizing the
information leak.
The covariance matrix K∗Z of the optimal perturbation noise which mini-
mizes I(X ,Y) can be found by solving the following optimization:
K∗Z = argmin
KZ
1
2
log
det(KX +KZ)
det(KZ) (5.4)
subject to
1
n
trace(KZi,Zi) ≤ Pi ∀i
KZi,Zi  0
KZi,Zi is Symmetric Toeplitz
KZi,Zj is Toeplitz
In the Equation (5.4), Pi is the power allocated to the noise stream Zi.
This provides users the flexibility to control the privacy of individual data
streams. By Lemma (1), the objective of the optimization shown in (5.4) is
a convex function. Furthermore, the set of positive definite square matrix
is also convex. Therefore, the optimization in (5.4) is a semi-definite opti-
mization problem. However, this optimization has to be transformed into
a canonical form of semi-definite optimization in order to be solved numer-
ically. Using the same approach presented in Theorem (1), we obtain the
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following equivalent optimization:
K∗Z = argmax
KZ
logdet(t) (5.5)
subject to
KZ − t KZ
KZ KX +KZ

  0
1
n
trace(KZi,Zi) ≤ Pi ∀i
KZi,Zi  0
KZi,Zi is Symmetric Toeplitz
KZi,Zj is Toeplitz
Next, we need to construct the model for the multidimensional noise which
is used to generate actual noise data points. A common way to model mul-
tidimensional time series is to use the multidimensional Gaussian-Markov
model as follows:
Zk =
m∑
i=1
ΦiZk−i + εk (5.6)
In Equation (5.6), Zk is an n-tuple containing the perturbation noise for
n data streams at time k. The coefficients Φi are n × n matrices and εk is
a n-dimensional zero mean i.i.d. Gaussian random variable with covariance
matrix Σ. The coefficients Φi and Σ are computed such that the covari-
ance matrix of Zk equals K∗Z . It is possible to determine those coefficients
by establishing a series of Yule-Walker equations and solve them using the
Levinson-Durbin algorithm [32].
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5.3 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the developed perturbation
algorithms with simulated data. In the first experiment, we want to show that
the proposed perturbation technique effectively hides not only the correlation
among data streams but also the correlation inside each stream. We generate
two correlated data streams [X1, X2] according to the following linear model:

X1
X2


k+1
=

0.9 0.1
0.2 0.1



X1
X2


k
+ εk (5.7)
In the above equation, εk is the two-dimensional Gaussian noise with zero
mean and covariance matrix
Σ =

1.0 0.3
0.3 0.5


In the model, we choose the coefficients such that the power of X1 is about
10 times larger than the power of X2, which is useful when comparing the
privacy achieved for each data stream. Using the model described in Equation
(5.7), we generate 8192 data points for each stream and use them as the input
to evaluate our proposed algorithms. As argued in the previous section, the
power spectral density of the original data and the power spectral density of
the perturbed noise have to overlap in order to provide privacy. Therefore,
we first estimate the power spectral density of both data streams X1 and
X2. To estimate the power spectral density of a random process given the
real data points, we first fit the data points into a 6 tap auto-regressive (AR)
model. Then the PSD of the random process is computed as the Fourier
transform of the auto-correlation coefficients of the inferred AR model. The
98
power spectral density of both X1 and X2 is presented in Figure 5.1 where
the x axis presents the digital frequency and the y axis present the power of
the signal in dB.
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Figure 5.1: Power spectral densities of X1 and X2
Next, we generate the noise stream Z1, Z2 using our proposed algorithm
described in the previous section. The power constraints for Z1 and Z2 are
the same as the empirical power of X1 and X2., respectively. The chosen size
of the covariance matrix for both Z1 and Z2 is 6. The power spectral density
of both the original data and the noise are plotted in Figure 5.2.
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Figure 5.2: Power spectral densities of original data and perturbed data
Observe that the power spectral densities of Z1 and Z2 overlap with the
power spectral densities ofX1 andX2, making it hard to estimate the original
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data from the perturbed data.
Next, we would like to compare the degree of privacy obtained by our pro-
posed method in comparison with the perturbation by independent Gaussian
noise. We perturb the original data with independent Gaussian noise and
the optimal correlated noise at different signal-to-noise ratios. Because the
original data is generated according to a linear system presented in Equa-
tion (5.7), the best estimator is a Kalman filter [10]. Therefore, we use the
Kalman filter to try to estimate the original signal from the perturbed data.
Figure 5.3 shows the error when estimating the original data from both data
perturbed with Gaussian noise and data perturbed with optimal noise. In
the figure, for the stream X1, the error when estimating original data if it is
perturbed with the optimal noise is about 20% larger than that perturbed
with Gaussian noise with the same power. For stream X2, however, the esti-
mation errors are the same in both cases. This is because the power spectral
density of X2 in Figure 5.1 resembles the power spectral density of Gaussian
noise. Thus, perturbing X2 with Gaussian noise is almost optimal.
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Figure 5.3: Estimation error when original signal is perturbed with
Gaussian noise and optimal noise
Next, we will evaluate the community reconstruction error when our pro-
posed optimal perturbation scheme is used. To do that, we simulate a large
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community by generating 200 two-dimensional data streams using the model
specified in the Equation 5.7. Then all of the data streams are perturbed
using optimal correlated noise at different signal-to-noise ratios. Finally, the
community distribution is reconstructed using the algorithm presented in the
previous chapter. The error of the reconstruction is plotted in Figure 5.4. We
observe that reconstruction error is very small even with a low signal-to-noise
ratio.
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3 3.5 40.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
0.1
SNR
R
ec
on
st
ru
ct
io
n 
Er
ro
r
Figure 5.4: Reconstruction error versus signal-to-noise ratio
Although Figure 5.4 provides a means to choose the noise power in order
to achieve a certain level of utility (reconstruction error), it is still not clear
about the level of privacy achieved at a fixed level of utility. Figure 5.5 plots
the trade-off between privacy (in bits) and utility (in community reconstruc-
tion error) for both data streams. It is clear from the figure that the utility
decreases when the privacy increases. This figure is useful in choosing the
best trade-off between utility and privacy in designing the application.
5.4 Conclusion
In this work, we presented the algorithms to optimally perturb multidimen-
sional time series. We show that the mutual information between the origi-
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Figure 5.5: Trade-off between privacy and utility
nal data and the perturbed data is a good measure of privacy. In addition,
we present an optimization framework to find the optimal multidimensional
correlated noise. Our data perturbation techniques allow users to perturb
multiple private data streams before sharing while allowing useful aggregated
community statistics to be reconstructed at the server side. With our pro-
posed privacy measure, users can easily control the trade-off between the
privacy and the utility, which plays an important role in designing partici-
patory sensing applications.
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CHAPTER 6
RELATED WORK
6.1 Data Hiding Techniques
In recent years, a number of techniques have been proposed for modifying or
transforming data in such a way as to preserve privacy. Such methods can
be classified into three main categories described in detail below.
First, randomization techniques that add noise to the original data points
have been used to hide the real value of sensitive data and other attributes
(e.g., the trend of the data over time) [47, 48]. They traditionally distort
data for methods such as surveys which have an evasive answer bias because
of privacy concerns [49, 50]. Fuller [51] and Kim and Winkler [52] show
that some simple statistical information (e.g., means and correlations) can
be preserved by adding random noise. In [6, 7], independent random noise
(e.g., Gaussian) is used to perturb user data. Privacy can be achieved if the
noise power is high enough. However, high noise power might decrease the
utility of the shared data as well and the authors do not quantify this trade-
off. Recently, Ganti et al. [19] proposed that correlated noise, which has the
same distribution as real data, can be used to perturb time-series data. This
perturbation method is resilient to traditional filtering techniques, such as
Kalman filter [10], and spectral filtering [8]. However, it is not clear if other
techniques can filter out noise from perturbed data more effectively. Our
perturbation technique, proposed in this dissertation, not only outperforms
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previous techniques in terms of privacy for a given noise level but also pro-
vides a guarantee on the achieved privacy, no matter what reconstruction
technique is used.
Second, the k-anonymity model [15] was developed because of the possibil-
ity of indirect identification of records from public databases. For example,
the identity of a patient can be inferred from their home address or cellphone
number. In the k-anonymity method, the granularity of data is reduced us-
ing techniques such as generalization and suppression. This granularity is
reduced such that any given record maps onto at least k other records in the
data. The l-diversity model [53] was designed to handle some weaknesses in
the k-anonymity model since protecting identities to the level of k-individuals
is not the same as protecting the corresponding sensitive values, especially
when there is homogeneity of the sensitive values within a group. Many vari-
ants of the above methods exist in current literature. A good survey of the
corresponding algorithms may be found in [54]
Finally, distributed privacy preservation [55, 56] is used to derive aggregate
results from data sets which are partitioned across these entities. While the
individual may not desire to share their entire data set, they may consent
to limited information sharing with the use of a variety of protocols. The
overall effect of such methods is to maintain privacy for each individual,
while allowing the aggregate results to be correctly computed over an entire
group. For this purpose, the data sets may either be horizontally partitioned
or vertically pertitioned. In horizontal partitioning [57, 58, 59], the individual
records are spread out across multiple entities, each of which have the same
set of attributes. In vertically partitioned data sets [57, 60], the individual
entities have different attributes of the same set of records. Both techniques
play equally important roles in a wide range of applications.
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6.2 Privacy Measures
The problem of privacy quantification has been studied extensively and a
variety of metrics have been proposed for different purposes. For example,
the minimal distortion metric [13], which measures “similarity” between the
original data and the anonymous data, has been used to measure data pri-
vacy. Another metric, called distinctive attribute [17], was used to guide
the search for a minimally anonymous table in a full-domain generalization
scheme.
The metric proposed in this work belongs to the category of trade-off met-
rics, which measure information leak and the utility achieved from the per-
turbed data. We note that the quantification of privacy alone is not sufficient
without quantifying the utility of the data created by the randomization. In
the early work [7], Agrawal and Aggarwal defined the information leak as
revealing of specific data in a tuple. Often though, information can be leaked
even if the adversary does not gain access to a specific data item. Such at-
tacks usually rely on knowing aggregate information about the (perturbed)
source data as well as the method of perturbation used when modifying the
data. Also in [7], the authors proposed the use of mutual information to
measure the leaked information. However, it is not used to evaluate the pri-
vacy in practice, because it needs knowledge of the user data distribution,
which is not available in general, in order to estimate the achieved privacy.
In [19], the authors justified the privacy as the error in the estimate of user
data given the perturbed data. However, a limitation in those approaches is
that they are only used to evaluate the effectiveness of a specific perturbation
scheme. In recent work [61], the use of the rate distortion theory was pro-
posed to analyze the trade-off region irrespective of the type of data source
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or the methods of providing privacy. However, this work does not address
the privacy problem for time-series data.
6.3 Applications of Privacy-Preserving Techniques
Privacy-preserving techniques have numerous applications in medical database
mining, homeland security and customer transaction analysis. In medical
data base applications, the Scrub system [62] employs privacy techniques
to de-identification of clinical notes and letters which typically occur in the
form of textual data. The Scrub system uses numerous detection algorithms
which compete in parallel to determine when a block of text corresponds to a
name, address or a phone number. It has been shown in [62] that the system
is able to remove up to 99% of the identifying information from the data.
The Datafly system [14] was designed to prevent identification of the sub-
jects of the medical records which may be stored in multidimensional format.
The multidimensional records may contain directly identifying information
such as social security number, or indirectly identifying information such
as age, zip-code or sex. This system was designed to address the concern
that removing only directly identifying information may not be sufficient to
guarantee privacy. The Datafly system is one of the earliest systems for
anonymization and it motivates a lot later works in the anonymity field,
including k-anonymity [15].
Several homeland security applications have been developed using privacy-
preserving techniques. In [63], a broad overview is provided on how privacy-
preserving techniques may be used in order to deploy these applications ef-
fectively without violating user privacy. An example of such systems is the
identity angel system [64], which crawls through cyberspace and determines
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people who are at risk of identity theft. A web camera surveillance system
[65] is used to monitor unusual activities in terms of facial count rather than
using more specific information about particular individuals.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The recent emergence of smart personal mobile devices allows ordinary users
to collect, share and aggregate data without the need for dedicated infras-
tructure. This new sensing paradigm allows new applications to be deployed
quickly and in a cost effective manner. The work in this dissertation addresses
the privacy problem arising in those applications when private time-series
data are shared across an untrusted entity in the community. We propose
new perturbation techniques that allow users to protect their data by per-
turbing them before sharing. In addition, we derive algorithms to reconstruct
useful community statistics from the perturbed data with high accuracy.
This work focuses on the privacy of time-series data. Time-series data is
vunerable to attacks because the correlation between data points in time can
be easily used to reveal original data if it is not properly hidden. Crypto-
graphic techniques can not be used in this type of application because no
trust hierarchy exists between data providers and data consumers. Further-
more, identity anonymization techniques may breach information because of
the strong correlation between the user’s identity and their private data. Pre-
vious research on perturbation based privacy for time-series data was mostly
ad-hoc because there exists no universal privacy measure. As a result, dif-
ferent perturbation techniques cannot be compared to each other; each of
them is usually proved to work in a very narrow range of applications. Fur-
thermore, the lack of a good privacy measure makes it impossible to derive
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optimal perturbation methods.
In this dissertation, we propose the use of mutual information between the
original data and the perturbed data as a measure of privacy of time-series
data. The advantage of this privacy metric is that it does not depend on the
original data model or on the type of attack. This advantage makes it possible
to compare the perturbation methods without making any assumption about
the attack methods.
Using this privacy measure, we are able to derive the optimal perturba-
tion methods for both single-dimensional and multidimensional time series.
Details of the optimization framework to find the optimal perturbation noise
were presented. The privacy achieved by using optimal perturbation meth-
ods is significantly higher than traditional pertubation approaches for the
same noise power.
We also propose algorithms to reconstruct community distribution for both
single-stream data and multi-stream data from perturbed data. A deconvo-
lution technique was used to reconstruct distribution for single-stream data
with success. For multi-stream data, we develop an EM-based iterative algo-
rithm to accurately reconstruct the joint distribution of the multidimensional
data.
7.1 Future Work
Since this work represents an early effort in this area, the emphasis was
on developing general methodology and techniques that provide privacy for
time-series data. The results presented here are very promising and suggest
that continued work in this area is appropriate. In particular, additional
work is needed to explore the relation between the perturbation noise power
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and the utility (i.e., the community density reconstruction error). Better
knowledge about this relation will help in developing better perturbation
techniques, making it easier for users to control the trade-off between utility
and privacy.
As discussed in previous sections, the perturbation algorithms proposed
in this dissertation work best if the random processes is stationary ARMA
process (or can be approximated with high accuracy). In applications where
the original data has different structure (e.g., distribution of the GPS data
points described in the traffic application in Chapter 4), the perturbation
proposed in this work cannot be applied. Thus there is the need to extend
the optimization framework to those particular applications. Further work
in this area can provide a way for the algorithm to adapt to changes in the
data model without the need to regenerate the noise model.
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